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35 I.  Introduction  (**) 
By  drawing  on  the analysis of  the  role of  monetary  policy in 
balance of  payments  adjustment  under different monetary  systems  a~d 
exchange  rate arrangements,  this  pa~er aims  ~t.focussing on  the 
crucial issues  involved when  attempting  to set rules  for  monetary 
policy coordination in a  system of  fixed  but  adjustable.exchange rates 
such as  the  EMS.  A proper  functioning  of  the  balance of  payments 
adjustment  mech~nism is crucial for. the stability of  an  exchange  rate 
system.  In  turn,  the proper working of  the· adjust.ment  mechanism  can  be· 
sought either  through  "rul·es'"  which make  the adjustment  automatic or 
througl)  prompt  "discretionary"  changes  in monetary policy,  which. 
requires  a  close degree  of  cooperation among  the central  banks  of. the 
member  cur.rencies  (and  the political willingness  to subordinate,  when  · 
necessary,  internal objectives to  the external constraint). 
After recalling the main lessons  from  the  gold  standard  and  the 
Bret.ton Woods  system,  the analysis will focus  on  the  EMS  as it works 
at present.  These  aie all systems  of  fixed  bui,  in different degrees, 
adjustable  exchange  rates  ( 1)  .•  In  Part  II the  two  main lessons  from. 
the e?rlier international monetary  regimes  are  summarized,  that is  : 
first,  that in a  system of  fixed  exchange  rates  the money .supply  of at 
least n-1  participants must  remain  endog.enous,  if the adjustment 
mechanism is to work  smoothly.  To  .Put  it differently,  a  fixed  monetary 
rule for. the  total stock of money  (but·. not  for ·the domestic  component 
of  the monetary base)  is incompatible with a  system of fixed  exchange 
rates,  unless  such a  rule is reserved implicitly or explicitly to  a 
recognized  ·~e.ader of  the  system.  Second,  a  stable  ~ystem needs  a  rule 
gover~ing "world"  inflation or,  however  measured,  the inflation target 
·of  the group  of  couJltries participating 'in it ae  well as  a  rule 
governing  the reaction of  countries'  economic  policies  to deviation of 
actual inflation from  the desired path. 
( **)  This  paper· was  presented at  the  Conference  on  the  El~S,  organized 
by·Banca  d'It~iia, Center for  Economic  Policy Research and.Centro. 
Interuniversit·ario  Studi  Teorici  per ta Politica Economica, 
Perugia,  October  16-17,  1987. 
The  authors are  indebted for  comments  to their colleagues  in the 
· Commission,  the  Banca  d' Italia, and  the  International Monetary. 
Fund,  in particular  to Manuel  Guitian,  and  Stefano Micossi,  as 
well as  to  the other· partici-pants  in the  conferen.ce  and  the 
discussant  Lucas  Papademos;  but  the conclusions are their own  and 
do  not  necessarily reflect the views  of  their previous  or  current 
employers.  Mr.  Nouriel  Roubini  of  Harvard  University provided 
extensive and· very useful comments,  which. significantly affected 
the conclusions. -2-
Part  III of  the  paper  is devoted  to  an  analysis  of  the  degree  of 
monetary  policy coordination  and  convergence  of  inflation and  interest 
rates  reached  by  EMS  countries.  In  particular,  we  investigate  the  role 
of  Germany  in  the  fight  against  inflation  and  the  balance  of  paymen-ts 
adjustment  mechanism within  the  EMS.  No  explicit  rule  concerning  infla-
tion exists at  present  in  the  EMS.  However,  there  has  been  an  accepted 
unwritten  rule  since  1982/83,  that  is:  Germany  decides  its domestic 
inflation rate  and  all other  members  adopt  policies  to  adjust  gradually 
their  own  to it, i.e.,  the  German  inflation rate  has  become  the  target 
inflation rate of  the  system. 
Part  IV  deals  with  the  question  of  how  the  working  of  the  EMS  could 
be  improved  by  making  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism more 
symmetrical  than  has  been  the  case  so  far.  It is  found  that  this will 
also  require  a  rule guaranteeing  low  and  stable  inflation  in all member 
countries.  Four  possible  co-ordination rules  for  monetary  policy are 
examined:  First,  the  adoption,  ex  ante,  of  an  aggregate  money  supply 
rule  for  the  member  countries,  an  application  to  the  EMS  of  the  proposal 
McKinnon  (1984)  made  for  Japan,  the  United  States  and  Germany  in  the 
context  of  the  reform  of  the  international  monetary  system.  Second,  a 
rule derived  from  the  first  involving  the  expansion  of  the  domestic 
component  of  the  monetary  base  (i.e.,  money  of domestic  origin)  in  each 
member  country  coupled  with  the  non-sterilization of  international 
reserve  flows.  Third,  a  nominal  income  rule adopted  by  each  member 
country  that  should,  however,  be  consistent  with  both  their  (independ-
ently determined)  growth  and  inflation objectives  and  the  aim  of  con-
vergence  within  the  system.  Fourth,  a  rule consisting of  the  adoption 
of  a  common  inflation target  pursued  by  each country  individually and, 
for  each  member,  a  suitable monetary  policy designed  to  achieve  it. 
II.  Lessons  from  the  gold  standard  and  Bretton Woods 
II.l.  The  gold  standard 
1876  can  be  considered  as  the  beginning  of  the  classical  gold 
standard  in  continental  Europe.  By  that  year,  Germany  had  completed  the 
transformation  of  its monetary  system  from  a  predominantly  silver stand-
ard  to  a  gold  standard.  From  1876  and  until  1913  all major  industrial 
powers  of  the  world,  including  the  United  States,  were  operating  under 
the  rules  of  the  gold  standard  with  London  being  the  financial  centre  of 
the  system.  During  this  period,  the  central  exchange  rates  between  the 
currencies  of  the  major  countries  were  never  changed.  It  follows  that 
expectations  that  exchange  rates  would  remain  fixed  were  very  firmly 
held.  Member  countries  gave  up  entirely their monetary  policy  independ-
ence  in  favour  of  free  trade  in  most  industrial  goods,  free  capital -3-
mobility and  fixed  exchange  rates.  (2)  Private capital  flows  are 
believed  to  have  been relatively large and  proved  to  be  generally of an 
equilibrating nature  because expectations  that  there would  be  no  change 
in exchange  rates were  so  firmly held.  The  need  for  actual  gold  flows 
to finance  current  account  disequilibria was  therefore relatively 
limited  (Bloomfield,  1959,  1963).  Nevertheless,  financial  crises 
occurred  in 1884,  1890,  1893,  and  1907.  Fiscal policies were  not  a 
source of disturbance,  as  budget  deficits were  modest  in size,  as  were 
government  revenues  and  expenditures  relative to  GOP. 
The  gold' standard  was  a  unique  system characterized  by  an  automatic 
rule governing  the  balance of  payments  adjustment  and  another governing 
the determination of  the  world  price level.  Thus  the latter was  outside 
the  control  of  governments,  including Britain which was  then  issuing  the 
key  currency of  the  system.  However,  this  proved  not  enough  to guaran-
tee perfect  world  price stability,  as  insufficient gold  production and 
German  purchases  of  gold  led to world deflation until  1896,  while  large 
gold discoveries  and  new  processes  to extract gold,  led  to  world  infla-
tion  from  about  1896  to  1913.  A weighted average  index  of  consumer 
prices  in  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  the  United States fell  by  about 
26  per cent  from  1876  to  1896  and  increased  by  about  19  per  cent  from 
1896  to  1913  (an  annual  rate of  1  percent  per year,  no  mean  feat  by 
today's  standards).  The  gold  standard  in fact  possessed  an  automatic 
stabilizing mechanism  which  tended  to  bring  the world  price  level  back 
to  long  run equilibrium.  (3)  However,  the  equilibrium world  price level 
was  not  impervious  to all  types  of  shocks.  In particular a  shift  in  the 
flow  demand  for  industrial  gold or a  shift in the  flow  supply of  gold 
could  lead  to  a  permanent  change  in world  prices.  Moreover,  the  sta-
bilization process  appears  to  have  been  extremely  slow,  as  shown  by  the 
long  periods  of deflation and  inflation. 
The  independence  of  the  equilibrium world  price level  from  the 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy of  the key currency country and  the automatic 
adjustment  of world  inflation (for at least  some  types  of  shocks)  were 
unique features  of  the  gold  standard.  Neither  the  Bretton Woods  system 
nor  the  EMS  have  these  properties. 
The  balance of  payments  adjustment  mechanism under  the  gold  stand-
ard  worked  as  follows:  assume  an  inflow of capital  into Germany.  The 
private discount  rate  in Berlin (the key  market  interest rate)  fell  and 
the differential  between  this rate and  the official discount  rate of  the 
Reichsbank widened,  making  it less  advantageous  for  commercial  banks  to 
discount  bills at  the  Reichsbank.  This  led  to  a  fall  of  earning assets 
and  liabilities of  the  Reichsbank.  The  reduction  in  the  Reichsbank's 
liabilities in turn  led  to  an  increase  in its liquidity ratio i.e.  the 
gold or metal  cover  of  notes  and  other  short-term liabilities outstand-
ing  (mainly deposits  held  by  banks).  Since  the  liquidity ratio was  the 
main  factor  influencing  the  Reichsbank's  decisions  to  change  the dis-
count  rate,  the  Reichsbank  was  promptly  led  to  reduce  the discount 
rate  (4). 4-
From  1896  to 1913,  the  period  during  which  the adjustment  mechanism 
worked  most  smoothly,  there were  in·Germany  98  changes  of  the discount 
rate or 5.4  changes  per year,  on  average.  The  variability within  the 
year  of  the  level of notes  outstanding was  also  extremely high:  the 
difference  between  the  highest  and  the  lowest  level  of  Reichsbank notes 
outstanding as  a  fraction  of  their average  yearly total  reached  a  maxi-
mum  of  74.6  per  c~nt in 1912  and  a  minimum  of  23.8  per  cent  in  1877.  A 
similarly high variability of  the  discount  rate  and  of  the  amount  of· 
notes  issued  is  found  for .the  Bank  of  England  (5).  The  role of central 
bank notes  outstandin~ can  be  compared  with that  of  the monetary  base  or 
the money  stock in  today' s  industrial  coun!=ries.  As  a  ·result of  the 
subordination of  the  discount  rate policy to  external  objectives ·and.of 
the-possibility of  central  banks  borrowing  fro~ each other  in  times  of 
crises,  balance  of  payrn~nts disequilibria and  international ·gold  flows 
were  limited. 
The  conclusion  that. we  wish  to  draw  from  this analysis  is that  the 
balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  between  the  main  industrial 
countries  worked  well  during  the  gold  standard.  In  the  case  of  Germany 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  both  the  Reichsbank and  the  Bank  of  Engl~nd were 
ready  to  accept  a  sufficient variability of  the  discount  rate and  an 
even greater one  of  the  relevant  monetary  aggregate,  thus  making  the 
adjustment·relatively  symmetr~cal.  This  experience  shows  that:  monetary 
targeting  is  inco~patible with a  smoothly working  and  symmetric  balance 
of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  under  fixed  exchange  rates.  The  system 
would  have  broken  down  if one  major  country had  attempted  to  target 
money. 
The  gold  standard  was  far  from  a  perfect  system.  The  world  price 
level  was  too  dependent  on  gold  discoveries  and  its automatic  adjustment 
mechanism  very  slow  to  operate.  Moreover,  there wete  government 1nter- . 
ferences  with  trade  and  capital  flows. between  the major .countries,  al- . 
.  though  on  a  moderate  scale  by  subsequent  standards.  In addition,  the 
balance  of.payments  adjustment  between  the  core  countries  of  the  system 
and  the  developing  countries  of  the  periphery was  asymmetrical  with a 
disproportionate  share  of  the  burden  falling  on  the latter.  Neverthe-
less,  in  terms  of variability of .output  and  inflation,  the  gold  standard 
compares  well  with  the  post  World  War  II  Bre-tton  Woods  system,  at ·least  ·. 
for  the  major .countries  (Eichengreen,  1984,  Sommariva  and  Tullio,  1987a, 
Chapter· I). 
What  worked  well  was  the  balance of  payments  adjustment  mechanism 
between  the  major  countries.  The  discretionary policies  of  their cen-
tral  banks,  which  aimed  pred9minantly at  stabilizing their respective 
liquidity ratios  and  maintaining  internal .co~vertibility, made  this 
result  possible.  There _was  no  con~lict between  the  internal  (convert-
ibility) objective and  the external  objective··of  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium.  ·There  w~re some  in~erfer~nces into  the  free  movement  of 
gold  on  the  part of  the main  central  banks,  which  resulted  in  ch~nges. in 
transport  costs.  For  instance,  the  Reichsbank  changed  at  times  the 
location of  its gold  window  from  Hamb~rg to  Berlin.  Nevertheless,  the -5-
effects  on  gold  flows  of  these  forms  of  capital  controls  must  have  been 
minimal,  as  suggested  by  the  fact  that  over  95  percent  of  the variance 
of  annual  German  international  gold  flows  from  1878  to  1912  can  be 
explained without  the  need  of  dummy  variables  for  "capital controls" 
(Sommariva  and  Tullio,  1987b). 
The  gold  standard  collapsed  in  1914  when  the  internal  convertibil-
ity of  notes  into  gold  was  abolished.  The  war  effort  of  individual 
countries  led  to high  budget  deficits,  inflation and  a  collapse  in world 
trade.  The  gold  standard  which  emerged  after the  First World  War  can 
hardly be  called  a  system.  Internal convertibility of  notes  into  gold 
was  not  reintroduced  in most  countries.  The  war  had  caused  large gold 
flows  towards  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  or  toward  coun-
tries which  had  not  participated  in  the  war,  at  the  expense  of  the  other 
continental  European  countries.  As  a  result,  the  world  distribution of 
monetary  gold  became  very  uneven  with  the  United  States  and  France 
possessing  a  very large fraction  of  it.  (6)  In addition  the  balance  of 
payments  adjustment  mechanism  did  not  work  smoothly,  as  domestic  objec-
tives  were  not  subordinated  to  the external  one  (Hawtrey,  1947)  and  free 
trade  and  free  capital mobility  became  the  exception  rather  than  the 
rule.  There  was  virtually no  attempt  at  coordinating  policies  nor  was 
the  United  States  ready  to  provide  the necessary  leadership 
(Kindleberger,  1976).  Budget  deficits  and  external  indebtedness  grew 
rapidly,  especially in Germany  in  the  second  half  of  the  1920's.  As  a 
result of  the  reconstruction,  the  introduction of  flexible  exchange 
rates especially in  the early 1920's  (7),  and  the  lack of  coordination 
of  economic  policies,  business  cycles  were  less  synchronized  in  this 
period  than  before  the  First World  War.  Table  1  shows  that  the  United 
Kingdom,  France  and  Germany  were  in  the  same  phase  of  the  business  cycle 
in 83.1  per  cent  of  the months  from  September  1878  to  August  1914,  while 
they were  in  the  same  phase  in only 45.5  percent  of  the  months  between 
June  1919  and  July  1932. 
Table  1:  Percentage  of  Months  During  Which  Countries 
Were  in  the  Same  Phase  of  the  Business  Cycle 
Countries 
United  Kingdom,  France, 
Germany 
United  Kingdom,  France, 
Germany,  United  States 
Source:  Morgenstern  (1959). 
Sept.  1879  -
Aug.  1914 
83.1 
53.5 
June  1919  -
July 1932 
45.2 
35.6 -6-
II.2.  The  Bretton  Woods  system  and  the  special  role of  the  U.S. 
Relative  to  the  gold  standard,  the  Bretton Woods  system  was  charac-
terized  by  (a)  a  greater degree  of  exchange  rate flexibility  (which 
entailed  a  greater variability of  expectations  of  exchange  rate  changes 
and  consequently at  times  large destabilizing capital  flows),  (b)  a 
greater asymmetry  in  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism,  due 
to  the  role  of  the  dollar as  a  reserve  currency and  the  insufficient 
response  of  American  interest  rate policy to  the  United  States  balance 
of  payments  fluctuations,  and  (c)  a  very weak  mechanism  tending  to 
stabilize  the  world  price  level,  especially after about  1960  when  the 
United  States  decided  not  to  make  its monetary  policy  responsive  to  the 
continuous  fall  in  the  ratio of  its gold  holdings  to  its dollar liabili-
ties  (8). 
Although  at  times  the  asymmetry  in  the  balance  of  payments  adjust-
ment  mechanism  caused  tensions  in  relation  to  the  proper division of  the 
burden  of  adjustment,  the  system  worked  well  as  long  as  the  reserve 
currency country  followed  policies  consistent  with maintaining world 
inflation at  a  low  and  stable  level  and  did  not  cause  a  shortage  of 
reserves  or  create an  excess  supply of  international  liquidity.  The 
strains  became  severe  when  the  United  States  embarked  upon  a  fiscal  and 
monetary  expansion  which  was  incompatible  with world  price stability. 
This  led  ultimately  to  the  breakdown  of  the  system as  other major  coun-
tries,  particularly Germany  and  Japan,  were  not  prepared  to  renounce 
their  low  inflation objective.  This  experience  underscores  the  need  in 
a  Bretton Woods  type  system  to maintain  the  price stability of  the  key 
currency. 
Scholars  of  international  monetary  systems  are divided  as  to  the 
degree  of  responsibility to  be  attributed  to  the  United  States  for  the 
1971  collapse  of  the  Bretton Woods  System.  Some  tend  to attribute 
greater responsibility to  policies  followed  by  the  United  States  since 
1964-65,  while others  emphasize  the  inherent  defects  of  the  system,  such 
as  the  insufficient  world  gold  production  and  the  ensuing  need  on  the 
part  of  the  reserve  currency  country  to  supply  the  international 
reserves  needed  to  finance  increased  world  trade  and  world  economic 
growth,  leading  to  the  well-known  "Triffin dilemma".  By  1975  Harry 
Johnson  concluded:  "The  fact  that  the  root  cause  of  the  disturbance 
that  shocked  and  finally wrecked  the  International  Monetary  System's 
adjustable  peg  was  a  world  inflation,  originating  in  President  Johnson's 
failure  to  accompany  the  escalation of  the  war  in  Vietnam  in  1965  with 
an  appropriately large  increase  in  taxes,  is  by  now  generally accepted" 
( John  s on ,  1 9 7  5 ) • 
Table  2  shows  the  huge  increase  in dollar  holdings  from  1969  to 
1972.  Triffin  (1978)  does  not  take  a  clear  position as  to  the  United 
States  responsibilities  but  he  considers  the  increase  in  dollar  holdings 
resulting  from  large  scale  intervention  to  sustain  the  exchange  rate of -7-
the dollar  as  the  cause  of  the  acceleration of world  inflation  1n  the 
1970's. 
Table  2:  The  Inflationary Explosion  of  International  Liquidity 
(dollar figures  in billions) 
End  of  End  of  End  of 
1969  1972  1977 
Foreign dollar claims  78  146  363 
On  United  States government 
and  banks  49  85  210 
On  foreign  branches  of  United 
States  banks  29  61  153 
International  Monetary  Reserves  79  159  319 
Foreign  exchange  33  104  244 
Dollars  and  Eurodollars  20  81  197 
Source:  Triffin  (1978). 
Triffin had  already foreseen  in 1957  the  collapse of  the  Bretton 
Woods  system;  he  was  wrong,  however,  in forecasting  its timing.  He 
explained  later that  the  system had  survived  longer  than  he  had  expected 
because  of  United  States political pressure  on  Germany  and  Japan, 
bureaucratic routine  on  the  part  of central  bankers  in  investing their 
surpluses  in the  largest financial  market  of  the  world,  fears  of  "rock-
ing  the  boat"  and  above all reluctance  on  the  part  of  other countries  to 
see  their currencies  appreciate vis-a-vis  the  U.S.  dollar  (Triffin, 
1978).  Robert  Heller attributes  the  large  increase  in official dollar 
holdings  in  those  years  to  a  shift  in  the  private demand  from  U.S. 
dollars  to  other currencies.  The  U.S.  liquid liabilities to  private 
non-residents  fell  from  US$28.23  billion at  the  end  of  1969  to  US$21.77 
billion at  the  end  of  1970  and  US$15.09  billion at  the  end  of  1971. 
During  the  same  period  U.S.  liabilities  to  foreign  governments  increased 
from  US$16  billion at  the  end  of  1969  to  US$50.65  billion at  the  end  of 
1971  as  central  banks  made  large  interventions  in  support  of  the  U.S. 
dollar  (Robert  Heller,  1976)  (9).  Heller also  shows  that  the  growth  of 
the  U.S.  money  supply  was  lower  than  in other  countries  and  concludes 
that  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States  was  not  excessively expansion-
ary  in  those  years  and  hence  could  not  have  triggered  the  shift  in 
private  portfolios. -8-
Table  3  below reports  the  rate  of  growth  of  Ml  for  the  U.S.  and  for 
the  average  of  10  industrial  countries,  excluding  the  U.S.,  from  1961  to 
1973.  In  virtually every year  the  rest  of  the world's  money  supply  grew 
faster  than  that  of  the  U.S.  The  excess  of  monetary  growth  in  the  rest 
of  the  industrialized world  with  respect  to  that  in  the  United  States  is 
particularly marked  in the  period  1961-1963  and  1970-1973.  A somewhat 
higher  rate of  growth  of  money  abroad  can  be  justified for  the  average 
of  the  period  by  the  higher  rate of  economic  growth  that  the  countries 
of  the  "periphery"  experienced  during  the  period.  The  difference  in 
real  economic  growth  between  Europe  and  the  United  States  was  particu-
larly high  in  the  early 1960's  as  a  result  of  the creation of  the  common 
market  and  the  ensuing  productivity gains  from  increased  trade within 
the  community,  the still relatively large  technological  gap,  and  the 
scope  for  shifts  in  employment  from  low  to  high  productivity sectors. 
The  differences  in  money  growth  in  the  period  1970-73  appear  for  the 
most  part  to  be  caused  by  other factors. 
Table  3:  Monetarl  Growth  in  Domestic  Currencies, 
11  Industrial  Countries 
(percentage  changes  in  annual  averages) 
United  10  Other  Industrial  Difference  Average 
States  Countries  1/  10  - u.s.  Difference 
1961  2.9  12.7  9.8  ) 
1962  2.1  11.0  8.9  )  9.2 
1963  2.8  11.7  8.9  ) 
1964  4.1  8.6  4.5  ) 
1965  4.3  9.3  5.0  ) 
1966  4.6  8.3  3.7  ) 
1967  3.9  7.4  3.5  )  3.7 
1968  7.0  8.1  2.1  ) 
1969  5.9  8.3  2.4  ) 
1970  3.8  8.2  4.4  ) 
1971  6.8  16.7  9.9  ) 
1972  7.1  16.1  9.0  )  8.5 
1973  7.3  13.9  6.6  ) 
Source:  McKinnon  (1986). 
1/  The  countries  are:  Belgium,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom. -9-
Individual  countries'  money  stocks  are  not  good  indicators  of  the 
degree  of  ease  or  restrictiveness  of  monetary  policy under  a  fixed 
exchange  rate  regime  with perfect  capital mobility,  since  they are 
endogenously  determined.  As  Swoboda  and  Genberg  (1977)  have  shown,  the 
only truly exogenous  monetary variables  under  Bretton Woods  were  the 
domestic  component  of  the  U.S.  monetary  base  (the  Federal  Reserve's 
claims  on  the  government  and  commercial  banks),  what  they  call  "the 
outside  portion"  of  international  reserves--i.e.,  international  reserves 
not  created via balance of  payments  deficits of  the  reserve  currency 
country  (or countries),--and  to  some  extent  the  domestic  components  of 
the  monetary  base  of  the  central  banks  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
latter in fact  becomes  partly endogenous  if these  central  banks  try  to 
sterilize international  reserve  flows.  It follows  that  if one  wants  to 
say  something  about  the  degree  of restrictiveness  of  U.S.  monetary 
policy at  the  end  of  the  Bretton Woods  system,  one  has  to  look at  the 
domestic  components  of  the monetary  base.  This  is  done  in Table  4  which 
also  shows  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments  deficit  and  the  rates  of  infla-
tion  in  the  U.S.  and  abroad. 
The  large U.S.  balance  of  payments  deficits  of  the  early 1970s  were 
clearly related  to  the  excessive  growth  of  the  domestic  component  of  the 
U.S.  monetary  base  (reflecting  in  turn  the  fiscal  imbalance),  while  the 
expansionary  "European"  monetary  policy  in  the  period  1968-69  retarded 
the  collapse  of  the  Bretton Woods  system.  The  excess  of  the  growth  of 
the  domestic  component  of  the  U.S.  monetary  base  over  the  foreign  growth 
rate was  -17.4  per cent  in 1968,  -9.7  in  1969  and  swelled  to  13.5  in 
1970  and  34.6  in  1971.  In  the  second  half  of  the  60's  the  favourable 
relative inflation performance  of  the  U.S.  had  also  ended,  which  could 
have  caused  by  itself a  downward  shift  in  the  private demand  for  U.S. 
dollars,  as  pointed  out  by  R.  Heller  (1976). 
The  U.S.  balance  of  payments  deficits  reached  unprecedented  levels 
in 1970-72  swelling  the  stock of  dollars  held  by  foreigners  and  the 
world  money  stock.  This  inflow of  international  reserves  could  only  in 
part  be  sterilized by  surplus  countries  by  reducing  the  domestic  compon-
ent  of  the  monetary  base  in  1970  and  1971,  which  thus  became  itself 
partially endogenous.  In  1972  and  1973  the  surplus  countries  gave  up 
the  attempt  to sterilize reserve  inflows,  as  indicated  by  the  large rate 
of  increase of  the  domestic  component  of  their monetary  base,  thus 
speeding  up  the acceleration of  world  inflation.  Swoboda  and  Genberg 
(1977)  have  shown  that  because  of  the  special  role of  the  dollar as  an 
international  reserve asset  in  the  Bretton Woods  system  and  the  rest  of 
the  world's  practice of  holding dollar  reserves  in  the  form  of  U.S. 
Treasury bills and  U.S.  or  Eurodollar  bank  deposits  (rather  than  in  the 
form  of deposits  at  the  Federal  Reserve  System),  an  increase  in  the 
domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  of  the  U.S.  had  a  comparatively 
larger effect  on  the  world  money  stock than  an  equal  dollar  increase  in 
the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
The  habit  of  keeping  dollar  reserves  in  this  form  implied  an  automatic 
sterilization of  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments  deficits  (10). 1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
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Table  4:  Changes  in  Domestic  Component  of  Monetary  Base 
and  US  Balance  of  Payments 
Domestic  Components 
of  Base  Money 
(percentage  changes) 
U.S.  Rest  of 
OECD  1/ 
5.7  10.1 
6.0  6.6 
9.3  18.1 
6.2  8.8 
8.5  10.1 
8.5  9.6 
9.9  10.6 
9.7  11.5 
6.8  24.2 
3.4  13.1 
10.0  -3.5 
14.5  -20.1 
0.6  36.0 
10.3  28.5 
U.S.  Balance 
of  Payments 
(in billions  of 
U.S.  dollars) 
-3.12 
-1.35 
-2.41 
-1.99 
-1.27 
-1.17 
-0.10 
-3.34 
1.73 
2.59 
-10.25 
-28.17 
-10.91 
-4.03 
Excess  of  U.S. 
Inflation over 
the  rest  of 
OECD  2/ 
0.28 
-1.64 
-3.22 
-3.38 
-2.18 
-2.44 
-2.11 
0.64 
0.14 
0.73 
0.82 
-1.77 
-2.58 
1.63 
Source:  Tullio  (1979). 
1/  The  countries are:  the  10  tn  Table  5  plus  Denmark  and  Australia. 
2!  Inflation  is  measured  by  the  consumer  prtce  index.  The  countries 
are  the  10  in  Table  5  plus  Denmark  and  Australia. -II-
The  magnified  effect  of  U.S.  domestic  credit  policies  on  the  world 
money  stock,  and  therefore  on  world  inflation,  also  implied  that  the 
balance of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  worked  asymmetrically,  with  the 
largest  share  of  the  burden  of  adjustment  falling  on  the  countries  of 
the  periphery.  Also  in this  respect  the  Bretton Woods  system differed 
from  the classical gold  standard.  As  to  the  countries  of  the  periphery, 
the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  worked  as  follows:  if  say 
expectations  of  a  sterling crisis developed,  capital  would  flow  out  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  putting  upward  pressure  on  British interest  rates 
and  downward  pressure  on  the  British money  supply,  as  the  Bank  of 
England  was  obliged,  under  the  rules,  to  intervene  in  the  foreign  ex-
change  market  to  support  the  pound. 
The  smooth  operation  of  this  "automatic" mechanism  implied  that  the 
Bank  of  England  did  not  and  could  not  fully  sterilize the  effect  of  the 
losses  in  reserves  on  the  domestic  monetary  base,  i.e.,  the  Bank  of 
England  had  to  let  the British money  supply fall.  (11)  To  the  extent 
that  capital  was  flowing  to  other countries  of  the  periphery,  the  ad-
justment  mechanism  would  work  symmetrically,  as  other countries  experi-
enced,  in  the  absence  of  sterilization,  a  multiple  increase  in  the  money 
stock and  a  fall  in  interest rates.  To  the  extent  that  capital  flowed 
to  the  U.S.,  the  burden  of  adjustment  would  fall  mostly  on  the  U.K., 
since  the  U.S.  money  stock and  interest rates  were  largely unaffected 
because  of  automatic  sterilization,  as  U.S.  banks'  liquidity was  not 
altered as  a  result  of  the  change  in  the  holder  of  their liabilities 
(from  the  U.K.  monetary authorities  to  other monetary authorities  or  to 
the  private  sector). 
The  preceding analysis  of  the  Bretton Woods  system  suggests  the 
following  conclusions:  domestic  monetary  stocks  were  not  the  proper 
indicators  of  monetary  policy,  while  domestic  credit  expansion  was,  both 
in  the  case  of  the  leading  country and  for  countries  of  the  periphery 
that  did  not  sterilize reserve  flows;  a  major  defect  of  the  system,  that 
impeded  the  smooth  and  symmetric  working  of  the  balance  of  payments 
adjustment  mechanism,  was  that  the  money  stocks  of  the  leading  country 
was  not  allowed  to  reflect  balance  of  payments  deficits  and  surpluses; 
finally,  a  monetary  system without  a  rule guaranteeing  stability of  the 
world  price  level  or without  a  central  reserve  currency  country  pursuing 
a  stable  inflation target  is  bound  to  collapse  sooner  or  later.  Michael 
Parkin  (1977)  has  shown  that  two  rules  would  be  required  for  the  long-
term  sustainability of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system:  a  rule determining 
the  growth  rate of  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  in  each 
country  and  a  rule determining  the  growth  of  the  world  money  supply.  As 
will  be  seen  below  the  above  analysis  has  some  important  implications 
for  the  significance  of  the  money  supply  in  Germany  as  an  intermediate 
target  and  as  an  indicator  of  monetary  policy during  the  EMS  period. -12-
III.  The  working  of  the  EMS:  1979-1987 
This  section  is  divided  into  three  parts.  The  first  analyzes  the 
degree  of  convergence  of  exchange  rates,  inflation rates  and  interest 
rates  achieved  so  far  by  EMS  members  participating  in  the  exchange  rate 
agreement,  and  discusses  whether  the  establishment  of  the  EMS  has  con-
tributed  to  the  reduction  of  inflation  in  member  countries.  Existing 
studies  on  the  degree  of  convergence  will  be  surveyed  and  new  updated 
results  based  on  the  "principal  component  analysis" will  be  presented. 
In  light  of  these  considerations,  we  then  discuss  the  leading  role  of 
Germany  within  the  EMS  and  analyze  the  contribution  that  German  monetary 
policy has  made  to  the  reduction  of  inflation  in  the  system.  Finally, 
the  working  of  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism within  the 
EMS  will  be  described  and  the  problems  arising  from  monetary  targeting 
and  from  sterilization of  international  reserve  flows  dealt  with. 
III.l.  The  degree  of  convergence  of  exchange  rates,  inflation and 
interest  rates  and  the  degree  of  coordination of  monetary  policy 
within  the  EMS 
Average  inflation  in  the  EMS,  as  measured  by  the private  consump-
tion deflator,  has  fallen  steadily from  a  peak  of  11.6  per  cent  in  1980 
to  2.3  per  cent  in  1986  (Table  5).  The  dispersion of  inflation both  in 
relation  to  the  mean  and  to  the  lowest  level  has  also  declined  consider-
ably  from  its  peak  in 1980.  Measures  of  dispersion  of  real  GOP  growth 
rates  show  instead  that  a  downward  trend  is  discernible  only after 
1982.  Measures  of  dispersion of  monetary  growth  also  indicate  that  the 
EMS  period  has  to  be  divided  into  two  subperiods:  one  of  high  average 
monetary  growth  rates  and  insufficient  convergence  of  monetary  policy 
lasting until  the  general  realignment  of  March  1983,  and  the  succeeding 
years  of  falling average  monetary  growth  rates  and  reduced  dispersion. 
The  key  factor  behind  the  greater  convergence  of  real  growth  rates  and 
of  monetary  policy  in  the  second  subperiod  was  the  change  in  France's. 
economic  policy.  Also  the  shift  in  economic  policy  in  Italy since  1981 
played  an  important  role,  as  the  authorities  accepted  to  see  their 
exchange  rate appreciate  in  real  terms  to  reduce  inflation.  In  Ireland, 
a  major  shift  in  economic  policy  occurred  also  in  1981  resulting  in  a 
real  appreciation  of  the  Irish punt.  As  in  Italy,  progress  in  improving 
the  budget  deficit  was  slow,  but  the  current  external  imbalance  and 
inflation were  reduced  markedly.  In  Denmark  the  policy shift  occurred 
1n  1982-83. 
The  fact  that  inflation has  been  reduced  and  inflation,  real  GOP 
growth  and  the  growth  of  money  have  tended  to  converge,  at  least after 
1983,  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  have  done  so  because  of  the 
existence  of  the  EMS.  De  Grauwe  (1986)  argues,  for  instance,  that  in 
non-EMS  European  countries  inflation  fell  more  sharply during  the  EMS A. 
B. 
c. 
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period  and  at  a  lower  cost  in  terms  of  foregone  growth  and  investment 
than  in  EMS  countries.  An  empirical  study  by  the  I.M.F.  (Ungerer  et al. 
1986)  finds  instead  that  there  is  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  ''the 
EMS  has  not  laid  the  ground  for  a  looser monetary  policy but  rather 
provided  a  framework  in which anti-inflationary policies  could  be  pur-
sued  more  effectively.''  In  a  more  recent  paper,  incl~ded in this  con-
ference  volume,  S.M.  Collins  rejects  the hypothesis  that  the  EMS  has 
contributed  to  reducing  inflation  in  the area.  Both  studies  regress 
inflation on  money  growth,  output  growth,  and  dummy  variables  for  a  set 
of  EMS  and  non-EMS  countries.  However,  the  main  effect  of  the  EMS  would 
be  on  the  path of  the  money  stock of  countries  which  felt  the  cons-
traint;  hence  regressions  of  this  type  cannot  be  conclusive.  In  addi-
tion,  several  countries  outside  the  EMS  behaved  "as  if"  they  belonged  to 
it throughout  most  of  the  period  while,  at  least  in  the  early years  of 
the  EMS  period,  some  members  did  not  behave  as  "full" members,  as  sug-
gested  by  the  principal  component  analysis  presented  below  and  in 
Appendix  1. 
Table  5:  Convergence  In  the  EMS  1/ 
61/70  71/78  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Private consumption 
deflator 
Average  increase  3.7  8.8  8.7  11.6  11.4  9.9  8.1  6.2  5.0  2.3 
Deviation  from  mean  .6  3.0  4.0  5.0  4.6  4.3  4.1  3.0  2.4  2.4 
Deviation  from  lowest  1.2  3.5  4.8  5.8  5.4  5.2  5.3  3.7  3.0  2.2 
Real  GOP 
Average  growth rate  5.1  3.2  3.8  1.9  .1  .2  .6  2.1  2.1  2.6 
Deviation  from  mean  1.1  .9  .7  1.1  .3  1.2  .6  .6  .5  .4 
Deviation  from  highest  1.9  2.9  1.1  2.0  2.5  2.8  1.4  2.3  1.7  .5 
Money  supply 
Average  increase  11.5  14.6  12.9  9.7  8.7  9.5  10.2  8.4  7. 7  6.9 
Deviation  from  mean  2.1  3.7  4.0  3.4  2.5  2.3  3.5  3.1  3.2  1.5 
Deviation  from  lowest  4.6  6.0  8.1  4.4  4.4  3.0  4.8  4.4  2.8  1.6 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 
1/  The  U.K.  and  Greece  are  excluded,  because  they are  not  part  of  the 
exchange  rate  agreement. -14-
Be  that  as  it may,  the  conclusion  of  the  I.M.F.  study appears  more 
in  line with  the belief on  the  part  of  European  monetary officials  that 
the  EMS  has  indeed  represented  a  binding  constraint  for  high  inflation 
countries,  which  has  been  reinforced at  times  by  the  real  appreciation 
of  weak  currencies  in relation  to  the  deutsche  mark.  In  this  respect  it 
can  probably  be  said  that  the  EMS  has  exerted  a  deflationary bias,  g1ven 
the  objective of  monetary  stability pursued  by  Germany.  This  has 
occurred,  however,  with  the  consent  of  other  members  and  is  not  in 
contradiction with  the  original  objectives  of  the  system.  As  Giavezzi 
and  Giovannini  (1987a),  and  Roubini  (1987a)  have  shown,  by  joining  a 
fixed  exchange  rate  regime  under  German  leadership,  more  inflation  prone 
countries  have  gained  "credibility"  in  the  disinflation process,  pro-
vided  realignments  are  not  frequent  and  entail  political  as  well  as 
economic  costs.  More  credibility would  also  imply  a  reduction  of  the 
output  costs  of  a  given  amount  of disinflation  (12). 
The  1986  I.M.F.  study also  compares  indices  of  variability of 
exchange  rates,  and  of  their rates  of  change,  of  the  rate of  inflation, 
the  rate of  growth  of  money  and  domestic  credit,  and  of  interest  rates 
in  each year  before  and  during  the  EMS  period  for  the  EMS  countries  and 
for  a  group  of  non-EMS  countries.  The  study  concludes  that  the  EMS  has 
brought  about  a  significant  increase  in  convergence  and  greater exchange 
rate stability among  its members  and  that "it does  not  seem  that  events 
exogenous  to  the  EMS  have  led  to  the  decline  in  exchange  rate varia-
bility among  participating currencies,  since  no  such  trend  is  evident 
elsewhere".  Other  studies,  including  the  most  recent  ones  by  Artis  and 
Taylor  in  this  conference  volume,  arrive at  the  same  conclusion  (Padoa 
Schiappa,  1985,  Russo,  1986).  As  to other variables,  however,  these 
studies  do  not  reach  similarly strong  conclusions. 
In order  to  gain  more  insights  into  the  degree  of  convergence 
achieved  by  EMS  countries  a  "principal  component  analysis"  has  been 
carried out  and  the  results  shown  in Appendix  I.  The  technique  allows 
the  isolation of  common  elements  in  a  number  of  time  series.  It has 
been  applied  before  to  inflation rates  in  industrial  countries  under  the 
Bretton Woods  system  to  isolate a  common  "world  inflation"  (Genberg 
1975,  1977)  and  to  interest  rates  to  analyse  to  what  extent  they  can  be 
explained  by  a  world  interest  rate  (Fase  1976).  It  can  be  thought  of  as 
a  correlation analysis  generalized  to  a  large  number  of  time  series. 
Table  6  summarizes  the  fractions  of  the  cumulative  variance  ex-
plained  by  the  first  principal  component  for  each  of  the  variables 
considered.  The  fraction  is  standardized  for  the  number  of  countries  1n 
the  group  for  the  reason  explained  in  footnote  (13). 
Table  7  provides  the  same  information  but  the  sample  is  now  limited 
to  the  countries  participating in  the  exchange  rate mechanism. -15-
Table  6  :  Principal  Component  Analysis: 
Fraction of  Cumulative  Variance  Explained  by 
First Principal  Component  - 17  Industrial  Countries 
Variables  1/ 
Exchange  Rate  2/ 
Consumer  price-inflation 
Nominal  short-term interest  rate 
Nominal  long-term interest  rate 
Ml  3/ 
1973/3-
1979/2 
.56 
.18 
.34 
.28 
.12 
Periods 
1979/3-
1983/2 
.70 
.19 
.70 
.44 
.11 
1983/5-
1986/3 
.83 
.24 
.59 
.31 
.20 
1/  All  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage  change  except  the 
interest rates. 
2/  Bilateral  exchange  rates with  the  U.S.  dollars. 
ll  Seasonally adjusted. 
Table  7:  Principal  Component  Analysis: 
Fraction of  Cumulative  Variance  Explained  by 
the First  Principal  Component  -
EMS  Countries  Participating in  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism 
Variables  1/ 
Exchange  Rate  ~/ 
Consumer  prices 
Nominal  short-term interest  rate 
Nominal  long-term interest  rate 
Ml  3/ 
1973/3-
1979/2 
.73 
.34 
.40 
.49 
.20 
Periods 
1979/3-
1983/2 
.95 
.26 
.76 
.49 
.16 
1983/5-
1986/3 
.99 
.48 
.79 
.36 
.24 
1/  All  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage  changes  except  the 
interest  rates. 
2/  Bilateral  exchange  rates  with  the  U.S.  dollars. 
ll  Seasonally adjusted. -16-
Several  indications  emerge  from  Table  7.  First,  the  fraction  of 
the  variance  explained  by  the  first  principal  component  is higher  for 
exchange  rates  than  for  any  other variable.  This  is  in  line  with  the 
requirements  of  the  EMS  which  have  exerted  a  stronger effect  with  time, 
but  was  also  the  case  before  the  EMS  was  created.  Second,  the  fraction 
is higher  for  all variables  in  the  third  period  with  respect  to  the 
first,  except  for  nominal  long-term interest rates  (14).  Third,  every 
number  in  Table  7  is higher  than  the  corresponding  one  in Table  6, 
implying  that  EMS  countries  experienced  both  before  and  after  the  EMS 
greater convergence  than  the  larger group  of  industrial  countries.  Fur-
thermore,  the  increase  in  convergence  of  inflation rates  in  the  third 
period  seems  to  have  been  more  pronounced  for  the  EMS  than  for  the 
larger group  of  countries,  thus  confirming  the  finding  reported  above  by 
Ungerer et al. 
111.2.  The  special  role  of  Germany  tn  the  EMS,  monetary  targeting 
and  the  inflation objective 
There  is  no  explicit  rule  governing  inflation  in  the  EMS.  An 
implicit  rule has,  however,  been  followed  so  far  since  1982/83.  Under 
this  rule  Germany's  role  in  the  EMS  is  similar  to  the  role  of  the  U.S. 
under  Bretton Woods:  Germany  decides  its desired  rate of  inflation and 
other member  countries  converge  to  it.  As  a  corollary,  the  asymmetry 
noted  above  in  the  working  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system is also  present 
in  the  EMS  as  it has  operated  so  far,  i.e.,  Germany  is also  in  a  posi-
tion  to  set  its monetary  growth  target  geared  to  ensure  its  own  desired 
inflation rate,  while  the  other members  adjust  their monetary  policy 
(i.e.,  their interest  rates)  to it.  Bretton  Woods  survived  and  the  EMS 
will  survive  ~s  long  as  there  is  agreement  on  a  low  and  stable  inflation 
target  and  member  countries  are willing  to  subordinate  their monetary 
policy  to  this  objective.  This  crucial  condition  has  been  emphasized 
also  by  Matthes  (1987)  and  is  implicit  in  the  stance of  German  economic 
policymakers.  There  are,  however,  several  differences  between  the  role 
that  Germany  can  play in  the  EMS  and  that  played  by  the  U.S.  under 
Bretton Woods.  The  most  important  difference  is  in  the  economic  size of 
the  two  countries  in relation  to  the other members  of  the  system  ("raum-
wirtschaftliches  Potential" as  Matthes  calls it).  The  U.S.  was  by  far 
the  largest  country under  Bretton Woods,  whilst  the  economic  size  of 
France,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom  is  relatively closer  to  that  of 
Germany.  Table  8  shows  the  share  of  U.S.  exports  of  goods  in  world  and 
industrial  countries'  exports  and  the  share  of  German  exports  in  EMS 
exports  in  selected  years.  The  shares  of  imports  are  also  reported. 
U.S.  exports  were  28.3  percent  of  industrial  countries'  exports  in  1950, 
but  by  1985  the  ratio  had  fallen  to  16.9  percent.  The  share  of  German 
exports  in  EMS  exports  (excluding  the  U.K.)  was  19.5  percent  in  1950  and 
35.8  percent  in  1985.  Looking  only at  the  share  of  exports,  Germany  is 
therefore  more  important  during  the  EMS  period  in  relation  to  EMS  mem-
bers  than  the  U.S.  was  in  relation  to  industrial  countries  under  Bretton 
Woods.  A similar  conclusion  is  reached  by  looking  at  the  share 1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
1985 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
1985 
Soor.ce: 
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Table 8:  Share of u.s.  arrl Gennan Exports and Imports of Goods 
United States 
In World 
Exports 
17.6 
17.9 
17.4 
16.1 
15.1 
13.3 
ll.7 
12.3 
ll.9 
In Ind.  cmmt. 
Exports 
28.3 
26.6 
24.6 
21.9 
19.7 
19.0 
17.8 
17.9 
16.9 
United States 
In World  In Ind.  count. 
Int:>orts  Imports 
16.0  24.2 
13.6  20.2 
D.2  19.2 
12.9  17.7 
14.2  18.8 
12.8  18.0 
13.3  18.8 
18.4  26.1 
19.2  26.6 
(In percent) 
Exports 
Germny 
In EM>  In EM)  In World 
incl. U.K.  excl. U.K.  Exports 
12.1  19.5  3.4 
21.7  31.0  7  .o 
27 .o  36.0  9.6 
27.6  35.1  10.5 
30.4  36.7  ll.9 
30.3  35.5  10.2 
29.2  35.0  10.2 
29.6  35.3  9.7 
29.9  35.8  10.3 
lnl>orts 
Gernanl 
In &\fl  In EM3  In World 
incl. U.K.  excl. U.K.  !Iq>orts 
13.6  21.6  4.5 
18.2  27.6  6.3 
22.5  31.7  8.2 
25.4  33.1  9.8 
25.7  31.6  10.0 
24.9  30.2  9.1 
26.2  31.2  9.7 
25.9  31.5  8.3 
25.7  31.3  8.4 
lliF,  International Financial Statistics, varioos isstEs. 
In Ind.  cOtmt. 
Exports 
5.4 
10.4 
13.6 
14.2 
15.6 
15.6 
15.6 
14.1 
14.6 
In Ind.  count. 
lnp:>rts 
6.8 
9.4 
ll.9 
13.4 
13.2 
12.7 
13.7 
ll.7 
ll.6 -18-
of  imports.  However,  Germany  is  a  much  more  open  economy  than  the 
U.S.  When  GOP-weights  are  used,  the  U.S.  share  in  industrial  countries 
was  and  still is larger  than  that  of  Germany  in  the  EMS  (Table  9).  This 
makes  the  German  economy  much  more  vulnerable  to  foreign  shocks  than  the 
U.S.  economy. 
Another  important  factor  is  the  size and  sophistication of  U.S. 
financial  markets  in relation  to  those  of  Germany.  The  deutsche  mark 
will  face  strong  competition  from  the  French  franc,  if capital  liberali-
zation  in  France  is maintained  and  Paris  becomes  a  major  international 
financial  centre and,  more  importantly,  if the  pound  sterling  joins  the 
ERM.  Thus  also  prospectively the  deutsche  mark  cannot  play  the  same 
role  as  the  U.S.  dollar under  Bretton Woods. 
The  third difference  is  the  great  importance  German  monetary autho-
rities attach to  price  stability.  Matthes  argues  that  Germany's  leading 
role  in  the  EMS  originates  not  so  much  from  its  economic  size  but  rather 
from  the  importance  it attributes  to  price  stability,  while  the  U.S.  and 
the  dollar  played  and  still play  a  leading  role  in  the  international 
monetary  system,  independently of  whether  the  United  States  pursues  a 
stable  inflation objective.  He  concludes,  therefore,  that  Germany 
cannot  depart  from  this  low  and  stable  inflation objective without 
endangering  the  EMS  and  her  leading  role  in it. 
The  fourth difference  is  that while  the  U.S.  had  no  explicit money 
supply  target  during  the  Bretton Woods  period,  Germany  has  one  under  the 
EMS.  Tables  10  and  11  show  Germany's  monetary  targets  and  their  imple-
mentation,  as  reported  by  the  Bundesbank,  as  well  as  EMS  interventions 
in deutschemark.  Except  for  1978  and  1986-87,  years  of  rapid  appreci-
ation of  the  deutsche  mark  vis-a-vis  the  U.S.  dollar  and  large  interven-
tions  to  stem  the  speed  and  extent  of  this  appreciation,  the  Bundesbank 
was  able  to  achieve  the  targets  initially set.  When  compared  with total 
interventions  (within  and  outside  the  EMS),  the  liquidity impact  of 
deutsche  mark  interventions  within  the  EMS  was  relatively small  or  nega-
tive  and  temporary  (except  for  1979  and  1981),  as  most  of  the  interven-
tions  were  intramarginal  and/or  were  later reversed  (except  for  1987, 
when  purchases  of  deutschemark after  the  realignment  of  January  12, 
1987  were  considerably  smaller  than  the  large  sales  effected  in  the 
months  leading  to  the  realignment,  see  section  B of  the  table).  When 
read  in  conjunction with  Table  12  (as  well  as  with  the  findings  of  the 
principal  component  analysis  mentioned  earlier),  the  data  show  that 
domestic  credit  expansion  (defined  as  the  growth  of  the  domestic  com-
ponent  of  the  central  bank  monetary  liabilities) was  endogenous  in 
Germany,  in  the  sense  that  it attempted  to  sterilize the  effects  of  the 
change  in net  foreign  assets  on  the  growth  of  the  money  stock.  This  was 
not  the  case  for  the  other  EMS  members,  most  of  which  did  not  even  have 
money  supply targets.  Throughout  the  period,  inflation  in  Germany 
declined  sharply  in  line with  the  deceleration of  money  supply growth. 1954 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1985 
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Table  9:  Share  of  u.s.  GNP  in Industrial Countries'  GDP 
and  of  German  GNP  in EMS  GDP 
United States  Germany 
In Ind.  count.  In EMS  includ.  In  EMS  exclud.  In Ind.  count. 
GDP  U.K.  U.K.  GDP 
45.88  10.19  15.33  6.80 
45.79  10.74  15.93  7.14 
44.74  13.28  19.11  9.05 
43.69  13.83  19.24  9.11 
42.04  15.54  20.12  9.82 
37.02  18.64  22.48  11.54 
35.41  22.74  26.71  14.11 
42.82  24.7 4  29.18  13.55 
45.36  25.17  29.63  13.12 
46.09  25.27  29.83  13.10 
Source:  IMF,  International Financial Statistics, various  issues. 
Table  10.  Germany:  Monetary Targets  and  Their  Implementation 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Target: 
Bank 
In the 
course  of 
the year]} 
8 
6-9 
5-8 
4-7 
4-7 
4-7 
4-6 
3-5 
'J!r9-12 
3-6 
(In percent) 
Growth  of  the Central 
Monel  Stock 
Qualification 
On  an  of  target in 
annual  the  course  of 
average  the  year 
s 
8 
8 
Lower  limit 
Lower  limit 
Lower  half 
Upper  half 
Upper half 
Actual  Growth 
(rounded  fi~ures) 
In  the  On  an 
course  of  annual 
the  year lf  average 
10 
9 
9 
11 
6 
5 
4 
6 
7 
5 
5 
8 
2/ 
Source: 
issues. 
Bundesbank,  Annual Report,  1983,  and  Monthly  Report,  various 
1/  Fourth quarter  to  fourth  quarter. 
2:/  Annualized  growth  rate  through  August  vis-a-vis  the  base  period 
fo1r  the  target  was  7.4  percent. -20-
Table  11.  Deutsche  Hark  Interventions  in  the  E'1S  ]j 
(In  billions  of  deutsche  mark) 
A.  By  calendar years 
1979 11  Purehases 
Sales 
Balance 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
Purchases 
Sales 
Balance 
B.  By  selected periods,  net 
March  21,  1983  to July 8,  1985 
From  the  first  trading  day  after  the  realign-
ment  of  March  21,  1983  to  the  end  of  major 
deutsche  mark  purchases  by  partner countries 
July 11,  1985  to April  4,  1986 
From  the  end  of  major  deutsche  mark  purchases  by 
partner countries  to  the  last  trading  day  before 
the  realignment  of  April 6,  1986 
April  7,  1986  to July 7,  1986 
From  the first  trading  day  after the  realign-
ment  of  April  6,  1986  to  the  end  of  major 
deutsche  mark  purchases  by  partner countries 
July 8,  1986  to January  9,  1987 
From  the  end  of  major  deutsche  mark  purchases  by 
partner countries  to  the last  trading  day  before 
the  realignment  of January  12,  1987 
January  12,  1987  to  February 20,  1987 
From  the first  trading  day  after the  realignment 
of  January  12,  1987  to  the  last  trading  day  before 
the Paris accord  of  February  22,  1987 
February 23,  1987  to  March  31,  1987 
From  the  first  trading  day after the  Paris  accord 
of  February  22,  1987  to  the  end  of  the  quarter 
Source:  Bundesbank  Report,  1986. 
Obligatory 
+3.6 
+3.6 
-5.9 
-5.9 
-2.3 
+17.3 
+15.0 
+3.0 
+3.0 
-16.7 
+8.3 
-8.4 
+4.7 
+4.7 
+0.4 
+o.4 
-19.0 
+4.1 
-14.8 
-11.8 
+o.7 
-19.0 
+18.9 
Intramarginal 
-2.7 
+8.1 
+5.4 
-5.9 
+1.0 
-4.9 
-8.1 
+12 .8 
+4.7 
-9.4 
+12.8 
+3.4 
-19.1 
+12.9 
-6.2 
-30.2 
+7.6 
-22.7 
-29.6 
+30.8 
+1.2 
-33.6 
+76.0 
+42.4 
-49.8 
+33.3 
-10.9 
+44.1 
-7.3 
-16.1 
Total 
-2.7 
+11.7 
+9.0 
-11.8 
+1.0 
-10.8 
-10.4 
+30.1 
+19.7 
-9.4 
+15.8 
+6.4 
-35.8 
+21.2 
-14 .s 
-30.2 
+12.3 
-17.9 
-29.6 
+31.1 
+1.5 
-52.6 
+80.1 
+27.6 
-61.6 
+34.0 
-29.9 
+63.0 
-7.3 
-16.1 
~e:uo  item 
Affecting 
Liquidity 
In  Germany 1J 
-2.4 
+11.7 
+9.2 
-ll.l 
+0.6 
-10.5 
-10.3 
+25.3 
+15.0 
-2.5 
+6.1 
+3.7 
-20.4 
+12.6 
-7.8 
-o.8 
+4.4 
+3.6 
-0.2 
-o.2 
-12.1 
+3.8 
-8.4 
-16.9 
+0.0 
-10.3 
+17.4 
-o.9 
-5.7 
1/  Deutsche  mark  intervention  by  other central  banks  participating in  the  EMS  exchange  rate  mechanis~ and  EMS 
interventions  by  the  Bundesbank. 
2/  Indicates  the  extent  to  which  deutschemark  interventions  in  the  EMS  and  the  settlement  of  creditor  and  debtor 
po~itions in  the  EHCF  affected  the  net  external  position  of  the  Bundesbank  and  thus  the  banks'  provision with  central 
bank  money;  excluding  transactions  connected  with  the winding-up  of  the  "snake",  which  was  succeeded  bv  the  EMS. 
11  As  from  the  beginning  of  the  EMS  on  March  13,  1979.  Discrepancies  in  the  totals  are  due  to  rounding. 
N.B.  +  equals  deutsche  mark  sales  or  expansionary  impact  on  liquidity in Germany. 
- equals  deutsche  mark  purchases  or  contractionary  impact  on  liquidity  in Germany. (4) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
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Table  12.  Germany:  Growth  of  the  Money  Stocks, 
the  Bundesbank  Net  Domestic  Assets,  and  Prices 
Money  Supply  1/  Net  Domestic  Assets  2/ 
10.1  22.1 
8.2  23.6 
3.5  47.4 
4.7  16.2 
6.1  5.8 
6.7  13.2 
4.8  8.2 
5.6  5.7 
8.8  -3.6 
Source:  I.M.F.,  International  Financial  Statistics. 
Prices 
2.7 
4.1 
5.4 
6.3 
5.3 
3.3 
2.4 
2.2 
-0.2 
1/  Average  money  stock is defined as  the annual  averages  of  monthly 
na;row  and  quasi-money  (lines  34  and  35,  respectively). 
3/ 
2/  Domestic  component  of  the monetary  base  is broadly defined  as  the 
do~estic credit of  the  central  banks,  the  sum  of  the  following  IFS 
lines:  claims  on  central  government,  official entities  and  deposit 
money  banks  (12a,  12b,  and  12e). 
3/  Inflation rates  are  based  on  the  consumer  price  index  (line 64). 
The  exogeneity,  or otherwise,  of  the national  money  stock  in 
Germany  under  a  system like  the  EMS,  has  important  implications  for  the 
determination of  inflation in  Germany  and  for  the  determination  of  the 
deutsche  mark/U.S.  dollar  exchange  rate.  In  order  to  make  the  point 
clearer,  let us  start  by  considering  a  system of  perfectly floating 
exchange  rates  (no  intervention of  the  central  bank  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market).  Under  such  a  system  the  money  stock  is  exogenous. 
Assuming  a  stable demand  function  for  money,  the  rate of  inflation  in 
Germany  will  be  determined  by  the  following  equation: 
n 
( 1)  P  =  l:  W.  (M  - m )  . 
g  t  1  g  g  t-1  i=o -22-
(la)  lnm  =  a  +  b  lny  +  c1  +  d  lnS' 
g  g  g  g 
where  a  dot  indicates  a  percentage  change,  ln  the  natural  logarithm,  Pg 
the  price  level,  Mg  the  nominal  money  stock  (  =  supply  of  money)  and  mg 
the  real  demand  for  money.  Equation  (1)  says  that  inflation adjusts 
gradually  towards  its  long  run  equilibrium level  due  to  the  existence  of 
transaction  and  information costs.  Equation  (1a)  defines  the  real 
demand  for  money  as  a  function  of  the  nominal  rate of  interest  (ig)'  the 
deviation  of  the  effective  exchange  rate  from  purchasing  power  parity 
(S'  ),  reflecting  the  degree  of  currency  substitution,  and  real  output 
(y 1.  In  the  long  run  the  price  level  is determined,  according  to 
eqflation  (1)  and  (la),  by  the  quantity  theory  of  money. 
Under  perfectly fixed  exchange  rates  the  Bundesbank  is  obliged  to 
intervene  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  and  the  German  nominal  money 
stock  is  no  longer.  exogenous.  Assuming  that  the  whole  world  is  on  fixed 
exchange  rates,  German  inflation is  determined  by  world  inflation and 
world  inflation by  world  monetary  growth  and  the  world  demand  for  real 
money. 
(2)  pg  =  pw 
n 
pw  =  1:  v. (M  - m  >  . 
i=o  1  w  w  t-1 
(3) 
(3a)  lnm  =  a  +  b  lny  +  c  1  w  w  w  w  w w 
where  iw  ts  the  world  interest  rate  and  Yw  the  world  real  output. 
The  EMS  is  a  regional  system and  in addition  exchange  rates  between 
members  have  been  adjusted.  Therefore  neither equations  (1)  and  (la), 
nor  equations  (2),  (3)  and  (3a),  correctly describe  how  inflation is 
determined  in  Germany.  While  so  far  inflation in  Germany  may  have  been 
still determined  as  in  equations  (1)  and  (la),  it is  likely to  be  pro-
gressively determined  according  to  equations  (4)  and  (5)  below,  as 
realignments  become  less  frequent  and  capital  mobility  increases: 
(4)  p  =  PEMS  +  s  g/EMS  g 
n 
pEMS  I  z.  (MEMS  - mEMS)t-i  .  l  1 
(5) 
t=o -23-
where  Sg/EMS  indicates  the  rate of  change  of  the effective exchange  of 
the  deu!sche  mark  vis-a-vis  the  other  EMS  members  and  S'EMS/$  indicates 
the  deviation of  the  ECU-dollar  exchange  rate,  excluding  sterling,  from 
purchasing  power  parity and  reflects  currency  substitution between  the 
EMS  block  and  the dollar  block. 
Demand  functions  for  money  specified as  in  (Sa)  have  been  estimated 
by  Bekx  and  Tullio  (1987)  for  the  aggregate  of  the  countries  partici-
pating  in  the  exchange  rate agreement  and  for  the  U.S.  from  the  third 
quarter of  1978  to  the  last quarter of  1985.  The  coefficient  of  the 
currency substitution  term  turns  out  to  be  significantly different  from 
zero  indicating  that  in periods  of  dollar weakness  the  demand  for  U.S. 
money  tends  to  fall  and  the  demand  for  EMS  money  tends  to rise.  Bekx 
and  Tullio also  show  that  the  deutsche  mark/dollar  exchange  rate  and  the 
ECU-dollar  exchange  rate were  explained  during  the  EMS  period  reasonably 
well  by  the disequilibria  in  the  money  markets  in  the  EMS  (excluding  the 
United  Kingdom)  and  in  the  U.S.,  as  suggested  by  the  monetary  approach 
to  exchange  rate determination.  The  equations  performed  better when  the 
currency substitution  term was  included  in  the  demand  functions  for 
money  in  the  respective currency blocks. 
The  disequilibrium in  the  German  money  market  instead  does  not 
contribute significantly to  the  explanation of  the deutsche mark/dollar 
exchange  rate,  independently of  whether  one  takes  into account  currency 
substitution or not.  These  results  suggest  that  despite  the  exchange 
rate realignments  within  the  system,  the monetary  policy of  France, 
Italy and  other countries  participating  in  the  exchange  rate agreements 
had  an  impact  on  the  deutsche mark/dollar  exchange  rate.  Although 
intuitive,  the  finding  has  strong  implications  for  the  working  of  the 
system.  First,  German  monetary  policy does  not  have  the  same  effective-
ness  as  under  the flexible  exchange  rate  system of  the  pre-EMS  period  in 
influencing  the  exchange  rate of  the  deutsche  mark,  at  least  in the 
short  run,  i.e.,  between  realignments.  Second,  to  the  extent  that  the 
monetary policy of  France  and  Italy influence  the deutsche  mark/dollar 
exchange  rate they also  influence  the  German  inflation rate,  at  least 
between  realignments.  Mastropasqua,  Mocossi,  and  Rinaldi  argue,  in 
their recent  paper  included  in this  volume,  that  the  German  monetary 
base  appears  correlated with  the  lagged  values  of  other  EMS  members' 
monetary  base.  The  partial  compensation  by  Germany  of  contractionary or 
expansionary monetary  impulses  originating  in other  EMS  countries  seems 
consistent  with  a  reduced  role  of  German  monetary variables  in explain-
ing  domestic  inflation and  the  deutsche  mark/U.S.  dollar  exchange 
rate.  The  finding  by  Giavazzi  and  Giovannini,  also  in  a  paper  in  this 
volume,  that  German  inflation is  underpredicted  during  the  EMS  period  by 
a  largely domestic  model  of  the  inflationary process,  may  further 
strengthen  this  argument. 
As  controls  on  capital  movements  are  reduced  in  Europe  and  cur-
rencies  of  member  countries  become  better substitutes,  the  effectiveness -24-
of  German  monetary  policy  in  influencing  the  German  exchange  rate  and 
inflation may  be  reduced  even  more.  Co-ordination of  monetary  policy 
between  member  countries  around  agreed  inflation targets  then  becomes 
more  important  than  at  present,  not  only  for  other member  countries  but 
also  for  Germany. 
III.3.  The  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  under  the  EMS 
If under  the  EMS  the  "automatic"  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
mechanism  is  to  work  smoothly,  it should  not  differ much  from  that  be-
tween  non-reserve  currency countries  under  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  If 
expectations  of  a  devaluation develop,  for  instance,  capital will  tend 
to  flow  out  of  the  member  countries  concerned  and  this will  put  its cur-
rency  under  pressure.  By  intervening  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  to 
prevent  the  exchange  rate  from  falling  outside  the  margin,  the  monetary 
authorities will  lose  international  reserves;  this will  reduce  the  money 
supply  and  put  upward  pressures  on  domestic  short  term interest rates. 
The  opposite  should  occur  in  the  country where  capital will  flow. 
In  comparison  with  the  adjustment  mechanism  under  Bretton Woods, 
the  task of  the monetary authorities  is  made,  on  the  one  hand,  easier by 
the  more  frequent  possibility to  realign  and  therefore by  the  fact  of 
not  having  to  defend  for  too  long  unrealistic parities.  On  the  other 
hand,  central  banks  have  to deal  more  frequently with destabilizing 
speculation,  because  markets  discount  the  possibility and  frequency  of 
these  realignments  and  because  capital  is  more  mobile  internationally. 
Be  that  as  it may,  the  smooth  operation of  this  "automatic"  mechan-
ism  implies  that,  for  instance,  the  Banque  de  France  and  the  Bundesbank 
do  not  sterilize,  or at  least  do  not  fully sterilize,  the effects  of 
changes  in their international  reserves  on  the  money  supply.  Full 
sterilization effectively leads  to  a  breakdown  of  the  automatic  adjust-
ment  mechanism,  if carried  out  by  both  the  strong  and  weak  currency 
members.  Interventions  performed  by  using  reserves  accumulated  with  the 
banking  system  of  partner  countries  lead  to  changes  in  international 
reserves  of  the  intervening  country  but  do  not  change  the  liquidity of 
the  banking  system of  the  country  whose  currency  is  used;  this  type  of 
intervention  is  therefore  asymmetric  and  shifts  the  burden  of  adjustment 
on  the  intervening  country,  as  was  the  case  under  Bretton Woods. 
The  EMS  statutes  contain  a  clause  that  forbids  the accumulation  of 
reserves  in  members'  currencies  except  for  working  balances.  However, 
this  rule  is  not  enforced  as  especially Italy and  France  have  accumu-
lated  large  reserves  in  Deutsche  Mark,  the  main  intervention currency. 
Interventions  in  U.S.  dollars  lead  to  changes  in  international  reserves 
in  the  intervening  member  country without  influencing  those  of  other 
member  countries  and  are  therefore also  asymmetric  in  their effects. 
However,  interventions  performed  by  directly  borrowing  currencies  from 
other  member  central  banks  increase  the  liquidity of  the  country that -25-
lends  while  reducing  the  liquidity of  commercial  banks  of  the  inter-
vening  country,  in  the  same  way  as  interventions  performed  using  working 
balances  of  partner currencies  held at  the  issuing central  banks  and  not 
with  the  banking  systems.  These  types  of  intervention would  automatic-
ally reduce  the  liquidity of  the  banking  system of  the  weak  currency  and 
increase that  of  the  strong currency,  in  a  symmetric  way. 
This  symmetry,  however,  is lost if one  member  country or  both 
adhere  to  a  monetary  target.  If only  one  has  such  a  policy,  the  burden 
of  adjustment  is  shifted on  the  countries  which  do  not  adhere  strictly 
to  a  monetary rule.  Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1987a)  present  evidence  of 
two  types  of  asymmetries  within  the  EMS.  They  show  first  that  Germany 
and  the Netherlands  intervened  very little at  the  margin  in  EMS  curren-
cies  and  that  they hardly  intervened within  the  margins,  while  France 
and  Belgium did  most  of  the  intervention  in  EMS  currencies.  They  also 
show  that  the  EMS  period  is associated with  a  reduction  in  the volatil-
ity of  interest rates  in Germany,  and  an  increase  in  France,  especially 
of  offshore rates  (15).  The  fundamental  asymmetry  lies  in  the  practice 
of  sterilizing interventions,  since  this  is  not  possible  in  a  durable 
manner  for  countries  facing  downward  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate,  no 
matter  how  the  financing  of  interventions  is  shared.  Mastropasqua, 
Micossi,  and  Rinaldi,  in  the  paper cited above,  estimate  that  Germany 
sterilized foreign  reserve  flows  to  a  significantly greater extent  than 
other  EMS  members.  The  sterilization coefficient  that  they obtained  is 
not  significantly different  from  -1.0 for  Germany,  while  for  France, 
Italy,  and  Belgium it falls  between  -0.30  and  -0.40.  Roubini  (1987b) 
shows  that  symmetric  intervention rules  are  a  necessary  but  not  suffici-
ent  condition  for  an  exchange  rate  system  to  be  symmetric;  central  banks 
must  also refrain  from  sterilizing foreign  reserve  flows.  Asymmetry, 
however,  was--and  is--appropriate when  inflation still needs  to  be 
reduced  in  the  countries  that  do  not  have  a  money  supply target,  but 
becomes  less appropriate  as  low  inflation levels are  reached  and  com-
mitment  to anti-inflation policies  is credibly undertaken.  It  is also 
appropriate  if demand  shocks  are originating in one  country only,  but 
not  if all countries  are  faced  with  the  same  external  shock. 
Why  does  Germany  then  insist  on  adhering  to  a  monetary  target?  Her 
reasons  are not  unfounded  and  should  be  clear  from  the discussion  in the 
previous  sections:  since  the  present  world  monetary  system has  no  built 
in mechanism  to  guarantee  the  stability of  the  world  price level,  as  the 
gold  standard did,  and  since  the  EMS  also  has  neither an  explicit  low 
inflation objective nor  a  built  in mechanism  to  guarantee  the  return  to 
an  acceptable  rate of  inflation,  if an  exogenous  shock  should  occur, 
Germany  has  made  a  hybrid  compromise  between  monetary  targeting,  which 
should  guarantee  a  stable  and  low  German  inflation in  the  long  run,  and 
a  fixed  but  adjustable  exchange  rate  system  such  as  the  EMS. 
If more  symmetry  is desired,  the  European  monetary  system needs  an 
agreement  on  the  target  inflation rate  and  on  a  rule  subordinating 
monetary  (and  fiscal)  policies  of  member  countries  to  the  agreed  infla-
tion objective. -26-
IV.  The  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism  and  the 
inflation objective within  the  EMS 
This  section will  investigate  the  implications  for  the  EMS  of  the 
adoption of  "rules" for  the  co-ordination of  monetary  policies  to  fac-
ilitate balance  of  payments  adjustment  and  to contribute  to  the  objec-
tive of  reducing  inflation and/or  keeping  it at  a  low  level.  By  drawing 
on  the  existing literature,  four  possible  rules  will  be  examined:  an 
EMS-wide  money  supply target,  a  target  expressed  in  terms  of  expansion 
of  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  in  each  country with  the 
agreement  not  to  sterilize international  reserve  flows  among  members, 
nominal  income  targets  for  each  member  country and  an  appropriate  infla-
tion  target  for  the  area  as  a  whole. 
Before  going  into  the  details  of  the analysis,  it is useful  to 
state which  EMS  institutional  setting  we  have  assumed  for  the  foresee-
able  future.  It is not  assumed  that  powers  are  transferred  to  the  FECOM 
or other central  institutions as  envisaged  in  the  "second  stage" of  the 
EMS  (16).  We  assume,  however,  an  increased  degree  of  capital mobility 
between  the  member  countries,  in  line with  the  declared  objective of 
reducing  and  eliminating existing capital  controls.  Greater  capital 
mobility has  obvious  implications  for  the  degree  of monetary  cooperation 
which  is consistent with  the  present  exchange  rate  system:  interest 
rate  policy will  have  to  be  better co-ordinated  and  more  subordinated  to 
external  objectives  than  has  been  the  case  in  the  past.  The  analysis 
developed  below  would  also not  change  substantially if Italy narrowed 
its  exchange  rate  band  or  if the  U.K.  joined  the  exchange  rate agree-
ment.  On  the  other hand,  it is  assumed  that  no  individual  currency  is 
by  design  recognized  as  the  reserve  currency of  the  system because  this 
would  be  politically unacceptable  and  is contrary to  the  stated objec-
tive of  placing  the  ECU  at  the  centre  of  the  EMS  (17). 
IV.l.  First  rule:  an  EMS-wide  ex-ante  money  supply  target 
McKinnon  has  drawn  the  economic  policymakers'  attention  to  the 
implications  of  currency substitution between  the  major  currency blocks 
for  domestic  monetary  targeting  and  exchange  rate  developments  (18).  He 
suggested  that  domestic  monetary  targets  be  abandoned  in  favor  of  a 
worldwide  (U.S.  plus  Japan  plus  Germany)  monetary  target. 
His  proposal  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  each  country's  infla-
tion  depends  on  the  world  money  supply  rather  than  on  its money 
supply.  By  regressing  U.S.  price  inflation  on  U.S.  money  growth,  world 
money  growth  and  the  effective  exchange  rate of  the  dollar  from  1973  to 
1984  he  purports  to  show  that  world  money  growth  and  changes  in  the 
effective exchange  rate  explain  U.S.  inflation better  than  domestic -27-
money  growth  (McKinnon,  1985b).  However,  Spinelli  (1983)  performed 
tests  on  McKinnon's  hypothesis  for  10  industrial  countries  from  1973  to 
1980  and  concluded  that,  except  for  France,  domestic  money  performs 
better  than  world  money  to  explain domestic  inflation.  The  addition of 
world  money  among  the  explanatory variables  only  improves  somewhat  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  regressions. 
Despite  the  inconclusive  outcome  of  empirical  tests of  McKinnon's 
hypothesis  for  the  major  currency areas,  the  discussion  of  the  previous 
section and  in particular the results  of  Bekx  and  Tullio  on  the deter-
mination of  the  deutsche mark/dollar  exchange  rate during  the  EMS 
period,  suggest  that  the  hypothesis  may  become  with  time  plausible at 
the  EMS  level,  if capital  controls within  the  area are  reduced  further, 
realignments  become  less  frequent,  and  the  single market  for  goods  and 
factors  of  production  is  achieved.  Bekx  and  Tullio have  already  shown 
that  the  deutsche mark-dollar  exchange  rate--and  a  fortiori  the  ECU-
dollar  exchange  rate--are better explained  by  the  EMS  aggregate;  changes 
in  the  ECU-dollar  exchange  rate  significantly influence  inflation in 
Europe.  Imports  of  finished  goods  from  the dollar area  are  important 
for  most  EMS-member  countries,  and,  under  unchanged  intra-EMS  parities, 
inflation in each member  country is  influenced  by  inflation in other 
members  via  import  price effects.  Finally,  as  the  stability of  intra-
EMS  exchange  rates  tends  to  increase and  the  ERM  tends  to  become  more 
credible,  wage  demands  by  labour  unions  may  also  tend  to  converge  and 
adapt  to  a  common  inflation objective  (19). 
If capital controls  among  member  countries  are  further  reduced,  as 
planned,  expectations  of  realignments  will  lead  to  shifts of  funds  from 
countries  which  are likely to depreciate  to  strong  currency countries 
and  currency substitution both on  the  demand  side  and  on  the  supply  side 
(via central  bank  interventions) will  render  domestic  monetary  stocks 
more  volatile and  less  important  as  determinants  of  domestic  infla-
tion.  It may  therefore  be  worthwhile  to  analyse  the  implications  of  an 
aggregate  money  supply  rule for  the  EMS. 
The  first  step in  the  process  of  fixing  a  common  money  supply 
target  (MEMS)  would  have  to  be  to agree  on  a  common  inflation target  in 
the  EMS  \PEMS)  (20).  The  second  step would  be  to  agree  on  the  poten-
tial output  growth  for  the  EMS  area  (tEM  )  •  Here  the  average will  be 
arrived at  by  aggregating  individual  coungries'  potential  growth  rates, 
not  a  very easy  process  since  some  countries  may  show  the  tendency  to 
overestimate  their potential  output  growth  to  achieve  a  more  relaxed 
monetary  policy while  others  may  have  a  tendency  to  do  the  opposite 
(21).  If  these  problems  can  be  solved  (and  this  is  a  big "if"),  then 
the  target  rate of  growth  of  EMS  wide  money  can  be  obtained  as  follows: 
(6) -28-
where  changes  in  the  velocity of  the  EMS-wide  demand  for  money  are 
assumed  to  be  zero  or  to  be  accommodated  by  providing  a  range  for  the 
money  supply growth  target  as  is  done  in Germany  (22). 
The  adoption  of  an  aggregate  money  supply rule  for  the  EMS  would, 
however,  present  several  problems.  First,  keeping  in mind  that  the 
ultimate  objective of  fixing  an  aggregate  monetary  target  for  the  EMS 
would  be  to  stabilize the  inflation rate within  the  EMS,  it is  crucial 
to  know  whether  the  EMS-wide  demand  for  money  would  be  stable  enough  to 
generate  the  success  of  this  rule.  The  study  by  Bekx  and  Tullio  men-
tioned  in  the  previous  section  seems  to  suggest  that  the  EMS-wide  demand 
for  money  may  be  better behaved  than  the  German  demand  for  money  (23). 
Even  with  the  inclusion of  a  term reflecting currency substitution,  the 
degree  of autocorrelation  of  the  residuals  is  significantly lower  for 
the  EMS-wide  demand  function  than  for  the  German  one,  during  the  EMS 
period.  Formal  stability tests  of  the  parameters  of  the  equations  have, 
however,  not  been  performed,  nor  have  demand  functions  for  money  for 
other  EMS  member  countries  been  estimated.  More  work  is  clearly re-
quired  in  this area.  In addition,  the  stability of  the  demand  for  EMS-
wide  money  may  be  reduced  by  the  ongoing  rapid  pace  of  financial  innova-
tion  in many  member  countries.  Financial  innovation  may  even  accelerate 
in  the next  few  years  owing  to  the  increased  competition  injected  into 
national  financial  systems  by  the  elimination of  controls  on  capital 
flows  and  of  barriers  to  the  provision of  financial  services  by  European 
firms  in any  member  country.  Finally,  while  the  instability due  to 
currency substitution may  be  smaller  for  the  EMS-wide  demand  for  money 
than  for  the  demand  for  money  from  each member  country  taken  individu-
ally,  it can still be  substantial  because  the  EMS  currencies  are  freely 
floating  as  a  block against  the dollar,  the  yen  and  the  pound  (24). 
Assuming  that  the  EMS-wide  demand  for  money  can  be  estimated  and 
predicted with  sufficient accuracy,  would  it be  feasible  for  European 
central  banks  to  set  ex-ante  targets  and  to achieve  the  desired  EMS-wide 
monetary  growth  in  the  absence  of  an  institutional  change  which creates 
a  European  central  bank?  There  do  not  seem  to exist at  present  the  pol-
itical conditions  for  the  creation of  such  a  central  bank.  Therefore, 
following  McKinnon,  an  attempt  is  made  in  the  next  section to  suggest 
operating  procedures  and  rules  to  share  the  burden  of  adjustment  among 
the  members,  under  the  present  institutional  framework. 
IV.2.  Second  rule:  an  individual  domestic  credit  target  for  each 
member  country with  no  sterilization of  reserve  flows 
It will  be  shown  in  this  section  that  if member  countries  fix 
individually  the  rate of  growth  for  the  domestic  component  of  the  mone-
tary  base  according  to  a  certain  formula,  and  refrain  from  sterilizing 
international  reserve  flows  within  the  system,  the  balance  of  payments 
adjustment  mechanism  could  work  smoothly  and  symmetrically and  the (5) 
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desired  inflation target  be  achieved.  The  rule  prescribed  in  this 
section is  optimal  in  the  sense  that  it satisfies  the  two  requirements 
that  a  system with decentralized  central  banks  and  different  monies 
needs.  Assuming,  for  simplicity,  that  the  monetary  base multipliers  are 
equal  to  one,  we  start  by  decomposing  equation  (6)  into  the  monetary 
base  growth  of  individual  member  countries,  in  the  absence  of  interven-
tions  vis-a-vis  third currencies,  using first  differences  rather  than 
percentage  changes  and  expressing all monetary variables  in  a  common 
currency: 
7 
(7)  6MEMS  =  6 i~1Mi  ' 
7  7 
=  6.E1(DA.  +  IR.)  =.E1(6DA.  +  6IR.)  1=  1  1  1=  1  1 
where  DA  is  the  domestic  component  of  the monetary  base  and  IR  stands 
for  international  reserves. 
Because  interventions  in member  currencies  cancel  out,  in  the 
absence  of  interventions  in third currencies: 
7 
(8)  .E
1 
6  IR.  = 0  1=  1 
equation  (7)  becomes: 
(9) 
7 
= .  E6DA.  t=I  1 
or  in percentage  changes: 
7 
(9')  =  .L1d.  DA.  1=  1  1 
DA. 
where  d.  = 
1 
1 
MEMS 
1s  the  share  of  domestic  assets  of  the  central  bank 
of  country  i  in  the  total  monetary  base  of  the  EMS.  Assuming  that  in 
each  member  country  DAi  grows  at  the  rate given  by  equation  (6') (i.e., 
the  proposed  rule): 
( 6')  DAi  =~-(pi +  yi)  where  ai 
1 
= 
DA. 
1 
M. 
1 
Substituting (6')  into  (9')  yields  the  following  equation: -30-
7  d.  7  d. 
(10)  MEMS  =.1:1 
1  p.  +ig1 
1  y. 
1=  a.  1  a.  1  1  1 
which  can  be  rewritten as: 
( 10')  MEMS  =  PEMS 
+  • 
YEMS 
which  is  equivalent  to  the  EMS-wide  monetary  base  rule.  The  substitu-
tion of  (6')  into  (9')  shows  first  that  if each  country  follows  rule 
(6'),  this  is equivalent  to  the  EMS-wide  monetary  base  rule  given  by 
equation  (6).  However,  while  there is  a  mathematical  equivalence  be-
tween  equations  (10')  and  (6'),  their interpretations are  quite differ-
ent.  If member  countries  follow  the  rule  of  equation  (6'),  equation 
(10')  would  hold  ex  post.  If member  countries  jointly decide  instead  to 
follow  rule  (6),  they  would  do  so  ex  ante.  Second,  it shows  what 
weights  should  be  used  to  compute  the  aggregate  EMS-wide  inflation rate 
and  GDP  growth  rate  from  individual  country  targets.  The  weights  should 
be  the  share  of  each  country's  monetary  base  (money  supply)  in  the  EMS-
wide  monetary  base  (money  supply),  since: 
d.  M. 
1  1  = 
In  Appendix  2  it is  shown  in  a  simplified  two  country model  that, 
if each  country  follows  a  rule  like (6'),  the  exchange  rate  system is 
stable.  Vice  versa  if each  country sterilizes  reserve  flows,  i.e., it 
fixes  the  total monetary  base,  the  exchange  rate  system is unstable  or 
indeterminate.  If only  one  country fixes  the  total  monetary  base,  the 
system  is  stable.  In  this  case it can  be  shown,  however,  that  the  speed 
of  convergence  is  slower  than  in  the  case  in which  both countries  do  not 
sterilize reserve  flows. 
Some  important  assumptions  under  which  rule  (6')  has  been  derived, 
do  not  hold  strictly at  present.  They  are  the  assumption  that  exchange 
rates  are  perfectly fixed,  the  assumption  that  the  productivity growth 
rates  in  the  traded  and  non-traded  goods  sectors  in  each  member  country 
do  not  differ,  and  the  assumption  that  member  countries  do  not  cheat 
about  the  sum  of  y.  and  p.  in  setting  their  target  for  OA  .• 
1  1  1 
The  possibility of  realignments  raises  two  problems.  The  first  1s 
technical:  if  in  the  ratio M·/MEMS'  M·  is  expressed  in  a  common  cur-
rency  using  central  rates,  ev~ry t1me  ~  weak  currency  i  is  realigned 
with  respect  to  the  common  currency,  the  weight  Mi/MEMS  is  reduced 
discontinuously.  Conversely,  if exchange  rates  for  the  conversion are -31-
kept  constant  the weight  of  high  inflation countries  will  increase 
through  time.  This  problem  can  be  overcome,  however,  by  using  fixed 
exchange  rates  for  the  conversion  and  by  changing  the  weights  every  5 
years  or  so,  for  instance when  the  weight  of  member  currencies  in  the 
ECU  is  changed. 
The  second  problem has  to  do  with currency substitution on  the 
demand  side:  expectations  of  realignments  can  influence  the  demand  for 
money  in  each country  and  lead  to  a  higher  or  lower  growth  in  the  nomi-
nal  demand  for  money  than  predicted  on  the  basis  of  Yi  or  p·.  This  can 
change  the  degree  of  restrictiveness  or  ease of  monetary  policy  in each 
country,  an  occurrence  which  may  lead  to  unwanted  output  and  unemploy-
ment  outcomes  to  the  extent  that  domestic  monetary  growth will still 
matter,  in addition  to  the  global  mo~etary growth,  in  the  transition 
toward  full  monetary  union.  Capital  controls will  contribute  to  keeping 
the  weight  of  domestic  monetary  policy higher  than it would  otherwise 
be. 
Differential  productivity growth  in  the  traded  and  non-traded  goods 
sectors  leads  to  a  further  technical  problem  in  the  long  run.  If  in one 
member  country productivity in  the  traded  goods  sector  grows  faster  than 
in  the non-traded  goods  sector and  because  of  institutional  factors  and 
market  rigidities nominal  wages  are  equalized  across  sectors,  prices  of 
non-traded  goods  will  have  to  increase  in  relation to  prices  of  traded 
goods.  Thus  inflation measured  by  the  consumer  price  index will  be 
higher  in  the high-productivity countries.  It will  then  become  necess-
ary  to distinguish between  the  common  inflation rate measured  by  the 
prices  of  traded  goods  and  the different  inflation rates  measured  by  the 
consumer  prices  or  the  GDP/GNP  deflators.  If  p.  indicates  the  infla-
tion rate measured  by  the  price  index  of  traded  ~oods,  equation  (6') 
will  have  to  be  amended  by  adding  a  term reflecting differential  produc-
tivity growth  in the  two  sectors.  This  is mathematically  tractable as 
shown  by  Michael  Parkin  (1977). 
A final  problem  could arise if some  countries  by  design  or error 
forecast  wrongly  the  potential  growth of  output  or  the extent  of  the 
productivity bias,  and  hence  consumer  price inflation.  Let  us  assume 
that  a  country desires  a  more  relaxed  monetary  policy and  intentionally 
overestimates  the  sum  of  y.  or  p.  •  It will  eventually  incur  a 
balance  of  payments  problem:  Unles§  the  country  reverses  its policy,  it 
will  have  to  realign its exchange  rate.  Countries  that  underestimate 
the  sum  of  y.  and  p.  will  be  subjected  to  large  international 
reserve  inflo~s or  pre~sure to  revalue  the  currency.  Thus  eventually 
the  market  will  force  countries  that  make  errors  to  fall  back  in  line. 
While  a  common  monetary  policy based  on  equation  (6)  seems  unfeas-
ible as  long  as  there  is  no  common  European  central  bank,  a  rule  such  as 
(6')  has  some  appeal.  First  it allows  the  money  stock  in  each country 
to  vary  in order  to  accommodate  balance  of  payments  fluctuations,  thus 
helping  to  smooth  and  make  more  rapid  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
process.  Second  each  central  bank  is attributed  a  precise  responsibil--32-
ity consistent  with  its inflation objective  and  its potential  output 
growth.  A co-operative approach  could  be  adopted  in  fixing  the  infla-
tion objective for  each member  country,  consistently with  the  desired 
degree  of  convergence.  The  Committee  of  Central  Bank  Governors  and/or 
the  Monetary  Committee  could  become  the  forum  for  these discussions. 
Once  exchange  rates  become  permanently  fixed,  then  there will  be  the 
same  inflation objective  for  each member.  If countries  feel  that  more 
convergence  is  needed  before  this  rule  can  be  applied,  they  can  in  the 
meantime  retain the  principle of  non-sterilization of  international 
reserve  flows  among  members  of  the  system,  which  is  an  important  ingred-
ient  of  the  rule  implicit  in  equation  (6'). 
There  is  no  need  for  a  stable relationship  between  DA·  and  output, 
for  the  proposed  rule  to  work.  All  that  is  needed  is  a  st~ble relation-
ship  between  the  total  monetary  base  and  output  and  shocks  involving 
symmetric  shifts  in  the  demand  for  money  deriving  from  autonomous  port-
folio  adjustments.  Only  for  this  type  of  shock will  the  control  of  DA. 
allow  stabilization of  both  nominal  output  and  the  balance  of  pay-
1 
ments. 
The  essential  appeal  of  a  rule a la  McKinnon  within  the  context  of 
the  EMS  lies  in  the  symmetry  of  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  and 
the  specificity of  the  required  common  inflation target.  It is an 
optimal  rule  in  response  to  symmetric  shifts  in  the  demand  for  money 
deriving  from  autonomous  portfolio adjustments;  it is not,  however,  an 
optimal  rule  in  the  case  of  asymmetric  demand  or  supply  shocks,  whether 
originating within  or  outside  the  EMS.  It is also not  optimal  in  the 
case  of  an  asymmetric  monetary  shock  (a  velocity change)  deriving  from 
an  autonomous  change  in money  demand  (or  money  supply  shock)  in  one 
member  country only or  in  the  currency area  as  a  whole.  In  these  cases, 
the  appropriate  response  would  have  to  be  a  realignment  (in  case  of 
asymmetric  external  demand  or  supply  shocks)  and/or  corrective action  in 
the  member  country originating  the  shock,  be  it monetary or  demand 
related.  This  in  turn will  require  the  resolution of difficult  con-
flicts  in  identifying  the  nature  of  the  shock  and  in deciding  on  the 
appropriate  asymmetric  response  (burden  sharing). 
Countries  that  have  very  large  and  growing  public  debts  may  show 
more  reluctance  to  adopt  a  rule  like  (6').  The  implications  of  the  rule 
for  real  domestic  interest  rates  and  the  derived  constraints  for  fiscal 
policy of  both  the  quasi-fixity of  exchange  rates  and  the  resulting high 
real  interest  rates  would  have  to  be  accepted  by  the  parliament  and  the 
government.  These  constraints  may  be  seen  as  contributing  to  the effort 
to  reduce  the  public  debts  and  deficits  in  those  countries  and  may 
therefore  be  quite  useful.  The  large  public  debts  and  deficits  in  some 
member  countries  and  the  danger,  however  remote,  of  monetization  of 
these  debts  suggest  that  a  monetary  policy rule  like  the  one  proposed  1n 
this  section may  not  be  enough  to  guarantee  the  long-run stability of 
the  EMS.  A rule  involving  fiscal  policy may  have  to  supplement  the 
monetary  policy rule. -33-
IV.J.  Third  rule:  nominal  1ncome  targeting  by  each  member  country 
James  Meade  (1984)  suggested  that  the  whole  panoply  of  demand 
management  policies  for  the  control  of  money  expenditure  should  be  used 
to  keep  total  money  expenditures  on  the  products  of  labour  (i.e.,  money 
GDP  or  money  national  income)  on  a  steady  and  moderate  growth  path.  In 
an  open  economy,  according  to  Meade,  monetary  policy has  a  comparative 
advantage  on  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate,  so  that  most  of  the  burden 
to  keep  money  GDP  on  a  stable moderate  growth  path would  have  to  fall  on 
fiscal  policy.  The  level  of  real  wages  and  changes  in  wage  differen-
tials  should  instead  be  used  to  guarantee  full  employment.  He  calls 
this  policy strategy "New  Keynesianism"  as  opposed  to  "Orthodox 
Keynesianism"  which  is  aimed  at  manipulating  money  expenditure  to  con-
trol  the  level  of  employment.  The  orthodox  Keynesianism  led  to  excess-
ive  inflation due  to  the  lack or unfeasibility of  an  appropriate  incomes 
policy and  the  existence  of  labor  market  rigidities. 
Meade's  proposal  has  some  appeal  for  the  EMS  because  it would  allow 
the  endogeneity of  the  money  supply necessary  for  the  smooth  working  of 
the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  process  within  the  syste~.  It would 
thus  be  consistent  with  the  adoption  of  the  rule  described  in  the  pre-
vious  section.  Money  GDP  targets  could  be  set  for  each  country  individ-
ually but  in  a  coordinated  fashion  consistently with a  declining  infla-
tion rate  in  the  higher  inflation countries  and  a  low and  stable infla-
tion rate in  the  low  inflation countries.  Fiscal  policy would  be  the 
primary  instrument  to  stabilize nominal  GDP,  while  monetary  policy  could 
follow  the  rule outlined  in  the  previous  section or at  least  follow  the 
rule of non-sterilization of  international  reserve  flows. 
Nominal  GDP  targeting  could  also  be  used  as  a  non-contingent 
rule:  as  a  velocity-adjusted  money  growth  target.  This  would  be  par-
ticularly appropriate if asymmetric  velocity changes  are  expected  (be-
cause  of  financial  innovation,  liberalization of  capital  movements 
etc.).  Money  growth  could  then  follow  the  path  implied  by  the  announced 
target  for  nominal  GDP  without  necessarily  implying  a  feedback  to  fiscal 
policy,  since  this  would  depend  on  whether  the  authorities  concerned 
were  prepared  to  fine  tune  or not. 
Recently,  Williamson  and  Miller  (1987)  have  suggested  the  following 
rules  for  monetary  and  fiscal  policy to  manage  a  system of  real  effec-
tive exchange  rates  with  target  zones  involving  the  major  currencies  of 
the world.  They  propose  nominal  domestic  demand  and  the  real  effective 
exchange  rate as  targets  of  economic  policy.  The  three  rules  are: 
(a)  that  national  fiscal  policies  should  be  designed  with  a  view  to 
achieving national  target  rates  of  growth  of  domestic  demand; 
(b)  that  differences  in  short-term interest  rates  among  countries 
should  be  revised  to  prevent  the  deviation of  currencies  from  their 
target  ranges; -34-
(c)  that  the  average  level  of  world  interest  rates  should  be  revised  up 
(or  down)  if the  growth  of  aggregate  nominal  demand  for  the  partici-
pating  countries  as  a  group  exceeds  (falls  short  of)  the  target  growth. 
These  rules  could  equally well  be  applied  to  the  management  of  the 
ERM.  Rule  (b)  bears  close  similarities with  the  domestic  component  of 
the  monetary  base  rule outlined  in  the  previous  section.  The  two  rules 
imply  the  same  "reaction" of  interest  rates  in  the  case  of  shocks  invol-
ving  the  balance  of  payments.  In  fact,  assume  for  instance,  an  asymme-
tric positive  productivity  shock  in  the  domestic  country which  leads  to 
a  strengthening  of  competitiveness  and  of  the  exchange  rate.  In  the 
case  of  an  interest  rate rule,  the  interest  rate will  have  to  fall  to 
slow  down  the  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate;  in  the  case  of  a  rule 
related  to  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base,  the  unsterilized 
inflow of  foreign  currency will  also  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  interest 
rate  and  slow  down  the  appreciation. 
Rule  (c)  allows  to  solve  the  so-called "n-1  problem".  Since  in an 
n- country world  there are  only  n-1  exchange  rates  n-1  interest rate 
differentials  are  enough  to  stabilize  them.  The  nth  interest  rate  (and 
the  average  interest  rate)  can  be  used  to  stabilize the  whole  system's 
aggregate  demand.  Thus  Williamson  and  Miller's "blueprint" are  a  refor-
mulation  of  the  rule  of  the  previous  section with an  aggregate  nominal 
demand  rule  added  to  it,  to  solve  the  problem of velocity shifts for  the 
area  as  a  whole.  It  is  a  truly  symmetric  rule. 
One  problem with  nominal  income  targets  (or  nominal  demand)  is 
caused  by  the  fact  that  the  lags  of  economic  policy are variable  and 
often  long.  If an  unexpected  fall  in  money  expenditure  occurs,  it takes 
time  before  fiscal  measures  influence  money  expenditures.  Furthermore 
there are  lags  between  the  recognition  that  a  fiscal  stimulus  (or  con-
traction)  is  needed  and  the  time  the  policies  change  can  be  implemented, 
as  fiscal  policy cannot  normally  be  changed  during  a  given  fiscal 
year.  Keeping  money  expenditure  precisely  on  a  desired  path  may  be 
easier  said  than  done.  However,  the  setting of  annual  or  bi-annual 
targets  rather  than  quarterly ones  could  make  the  task easier. 
Generally,  the  view  behind  the  nominal  income  rule  is  one  of  more 
"activism"  of  fiscal  policy.  According  to  the  "activist" view,  fiscal 
policy  should  be  actively  used  to  support  weak  business  cycles  and 
dampen  excessive  aggregate  demand  growth.  This  view  contrasts  with  the 
view  behind  the  monetary  rule  described  by  equation  (6')  in  the  previous 
section  which  is  based  on  "non-activism".  While  in  principle  the  two 
rules  could  coexist,  it is  important  to  understand  this difference. 
The  extent  to  which  fiscal  policy  can  be  used  "actively"  to  even 
out  the  business  cycle  depends  in  part  on  the  level  of  the  public  debt 
and  budget  deficit  in  the  country.  If disequilibria  accumulated  from 
the  past  are  large,  the  "room  for  manoeuvre"  is  limited.  Thus  a  nominal 
income  rule  for  each  of  the  member  countries  would  imply  severe  asymme--35-
tries  between  members,  as  countries  like Italy and  Belgium  should  not 
lose  sight  of  the  long  term objective of  reducing  public  debts  and 
budget  deficits.  For  them,  an  announced  rule  to  reduce  the ratio of  the 
government  deficit  to  GDP  by  one  or  more  percentage  points  per  year  may 
be  more  compatible with  the  monetary  rule  implicit  in  equation  (6')  than 
using  fiscal  policy actively to  achieve  a  given nominal  income  or  demand 
target. 
IV.4.  Fourth rule:  a  common  inflation target  and  a  monetary  rule  for 
each  country  individually 
The  above  sections  have  tried  to  show:  (a)  that  the  symmetric 
working  of  any  pegged  exchange  rate  system  is  incompatible  with  a  rigid 
money  supply rule.  This  is  true  for  the  gold  standard,  for  Bretton 
Woods,  as  well  as  for  the  EMS;  (b)  that  it is  important  for  the  system 
to  have  some  anchor  for  inflationary expectations  and  a  mechanism  tend-
ing  to  stabilize  inflation,  such  as  under  the  gold  standard;  (c)  that 
there  is  no  precise "rule" which  could  be  optimal  in all  circum-
stances.  McKinnon  (1977)  has  therefore  proposed  that  member  countries 
should  agree  upon  the  final,  rather  than  intermediate  target,  i.e.,  a 
common  inflation target,  measured  by  the  prices  of  traded  goods,  which 
under  fixed  exchange  rates  will  be  the  same  for all members.  The  rate 
of  inflation of  traded  goods  prices  on  which  an  agreement  is easiest 
would  probably  be  zero.  Wholesale  prices  are  the  existing  index  which 
best  approximates  an  ideal  index  of  traded  goods  prices.  Consumer  price 
inflation will  be  different  among  members  if productivity  in  the  traded 
and  non-traded  goods  sectors  grows  at differential  rates,  given  existing 
labor market  rigidities.  The  proposed  rule  is  the  following:  if the 
targeted  EMS  inflation rate accelerates  above  the  intended  path,  mone-
tary policy  should  be  restricted  in a  coordinated  fashion  with countries 
where  it accelerates  more,  adopting  a  relatively more  restrictive 
stance,  (i.e.,  reducing  more  than  proportionately  the  growth  in  the 
monetary aggregates).  The  Monetary  Committee  may  become  the  inflation 
forum  where  the  performance  of  EMS  inflation is evaluated  and  changes  tn 
monetary  policy suggested  to  the  central  banks  of  member  countries. 
Fiscal  policy could  also  be  restricted in order  to assist monetary 
policy  in  reducing  inflation when  it accelerates,  and  expanded  when 
inflation falls  below  zero.  Because  the  lags  with  which  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy affect  inflation may  be  long,  targets  may  have  to  be  set 
for  periods  longer  than  one  year.  It would  seem  preferable  to  set  the 
inflation targets  in  terms  of  "underlying"  inflation rates  and  not 
actual  inflation rates:  i.e.,  exogenous  price  shocks  should  be  removed 
from  actual  inflation (oil  shocks,  maybe  also  indirect  taxes). 
McKinnon's  proposal  to  target  a  common  (and  low)  rate  of  inflation 
based  on  a  common  index  see~s appealing  if the  difference  between  pro-
ductivity growth  in  the  traded  and  non-traded  goods  sectors  is  signifi--36-
cant.  A case  could  also  be  made  to  target  consumer  prices  because  the 
latter are  more  stable  and  less  influenced  by  exchange  rate  developments 
and  also  because  they  represent  the politically more  sensitive inflation 
rate.  As  convergence  of  real  economic  performance  among  member  coun-
tries proceeds  with  the  creation of  the  internal  market  and  the  ensuing 
further  integration of  the  real  economies,  the  economic  significance of 
the  productivity bias  is  likely to  become  smaller,  thus  strengthening 
the  case  for  targeting  consumer  prices  rather  than  wholesale  prices. 
This  proposal  presents  technical  problems  which  are  not  easy  to 
solve:  the  adjustment  of  consumer  prices  for  the  effects  of  exogenous 
shocks  to arrive at  the  "underlying  inflation rate",  and  above  all  the 
agreement  on  the  relative  importance  of  the  various  factors  affecting 
inflation:  money,  wages,  fiscal  policy,  import  prices.  There  are still 
large theoretical  differences  among  European  central  banks  as  to  the 
relative  importance  of  each  factor  for  inflation.  In  addition  there  1s 
the  problem of  the  long  and  variable  lags  between  policy changes  and 
inflation.  An  analysis  of  what  existing econometric  models  of  the 
various  countries  could  tell  in  this  respect  would  take  us  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  paper.  However,  if  EMS  member  countries  find  this  rule 
appealing,  then  a  comparative  study of  these  models  should  certainly be 
commissioned. 
V.  Conclusions 
This  paper  has  analysed  the  working  of  the  gold  standard,  the 
Bretton Woods  system,  and  of  the  EMS  so  far.  The  lessons  drawn  from 
this analysis  are first  that  in  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  the  money 
supply  cannot  be  exogenously  determined  by  the  monetary authorities  of 
individual  countries  without  interfering with  the  balance  of  payments 
adjustment  process.  This  is  the  more  true  the  greater the  degree  of 
capital mobility in  a  system.  However,  in  each  system and  to  different 
degrees,  a  leader  has  emerged  providing  the  "anchor"  to  the  system  and 
having  a  greater degree  of  monetary  autonomy  than  the  other members. 
The  second  lesson  is  that  a  properly functioning  fixed  or adjustable 
exchange  rate  system  needs  a  rule  governing  inflation.  The  gold  stand-
ard  had  such  a  rule,  albeit  an  imperfect  one,  Bretton  Wo)ds  and  the  EMS 
do  not.  To  the  extent  that  in  the latter  two  systems  the  n-th country 
(the "leader")  has  also  provided  an  acceptable  inflation anchor,  the 
system has  operated  satisfactorily but  in  an  asymmetric  manner. 
Having  established  that  a  properly  functioning  exchange  rate  system 
needs  rules  governing  inflation and  rules  guaranteeing  smooth  balance  of 
payments  adjustment,  in  Section  IV  four  rules  were  discussed  that  could 
lead,  under  a  broadly  unchanged  institutional  setting,  to  an  improvement 
in  the  functioning  of  the  EMS  system.  While  these  rules  were  proposed 
in  the  wider  context  of  the  international  monetary  system,  they  could  be 
extended  to  the  EMS  proper.  They  are  not  intended  to  be  proposals  for -37-
reform but  only working  hypotheses  to  stimulate  the discussion.  The 
rules  discussed  were:  a  common  EMS-wide  money  supply  target a la 
McKinnon  fixed  ex-ante,  a  rule  which  consists  in  setting  the  growth  rate 
of  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  in  each  country  on  the 
basis  of  the  inflation target  and  of  potential  output  growth  (coupled 
with no  sterilization of  interventions),  a  nominal  demand/income  target 
rule a la Williamson-Miller  and  the  rule  to  target  monetary  policy  (and 
fiscal  policy?)  at  a  commonly  agreed  measure  of  inflation.  It was  found 
that  no  rule  could  provide  an  "optimal"  response  to all  shocks,  particu-
larly when  based  on  intermediate  targets.  In  particular,  while  symmetry 
was  a  desirable feature,  it would  not  provide,  per  se,  a  desirable 
outcome  in all circumstances.  Therefore,  the  need  for  concentrating  on 
a  final  target  (i.e.,  inflation)  and  adapting  the  policy  response  to  the 
nature  and  origin of  the  shock  must  prevail  in  the  present  institutional 
context. 
The  EMS  has  been  s1nce  its  inception  and  still is  in  a  transition 
stage.  Initially there  was  no  agreement  (not  even  implicit)  on  infla-
tion and  the  system  had  to  undergo  several  realignments.  After  1983  an 
implicit  agreement  on  inflation emerged,  namely  to  converge  towards  the 
German  inflation rate  and  to let Germany  determine  the  "anchor"  infla-
tion rate of  the  system.  Discretionary coordination of  monetary  policy 
and  to  a  lesser extent  of  fiscal  policies  emerged,  but  given  the  initial 
inflation differentials  and  the different disequilibria accumulated  from 
the past,  realignments  were  still necessary.  At  present  we  have  sub-
stantially greater convergence  of  inflation,  and  inflation differentials 
are  smaller  than  the  permitted  fluctuation  of  exchange  rates  within  the 
band.  Roughly  since  1986  a  new  challenge  to  the  system  is  emerging,  the 
increased  degree  of  capital mobility.  Independence  of  monetary  policy, 
fixed  exchange  rates  and  totally free  capital mobility are  not  consis-
tent with each other.  In  the  future,  the  independence  of  monetary 
policy will  have  to  be  constrained  by  more  rigid rules,  since  the  major 
achievements  of  the  EMS,  a  relative stability of  real  exchange  rates 
among  members,  should  not  be  abandoned,  and  free  capital mobility, 
albeit with  safeguard  clauses,  is  a  necessary building  block of  a  truly 
common  European  market  for  goods,  services  and  factors  of  production. 
The  rule  implied  by  equation  (6'),  that  members  expand  the  domestic 
component  of  the  monetary  base  according  to  the  targeted  inflation rate 
and  the  potential  output  growth,  seems  to  be  the  most  promising  of  all 
those discussed  if  symmetry  is  desired  and  appropriate.  Its main  impli-
cation  is  the  non-sterilization of  intra-EMS  international  reserve 
flows,  but  this  would  be  appropriate  only  in  response  to  symmetric 
shifts  in  the  demand  for  money  in  member  countries.  Therefore,  a  degree 
of  asymmetry will  remain  necessary  in  response  to  other  shocks,  involv-
ing  the  use  of  fiscal  policy  in  a  co-ordinated  fashion  as  well.  The 
recent  agreement  for  the  financing  of  intramarginal  interventions  by  the 
monetary  authorities  in  an  ad-hoc  manner  goes  in  this direction.  It is 
to  be  part  of  and  supplemented  by  stricter surveillance with  a  view  to 
identifying  the appropriate  response  to  incoming  shocks.  At  the  same 
time  central  banks  could  consider  putting  their credibility more  on -38-
achieving  final  economic  policy targets  (inflation)  rather  than  domestic 
monetary growth,  as  suggested  by  the  fourth  rule. 
Co-ordination of  monetary  policies will  remain difficult if re-
alignments  are  large  and  provide  incentives  for  one-way  bets,  and  there-
fore  destabilizing speculative capital  movements.  Given  the  achieved 
convergence  of  inflation rates,  this  problem would  be  lessened  if re-
alignments  were  infrequent,  but  nevertheless  remained  small  so  that  any 
new  agreed  band  would  overlap with  the  previous  one.  To  maintain  the 
"disciplinary" character of  the  system,  they  should  also  not  completely 
offset  inflation differentials,  however  measured,  unless  flanked  by 
credible stabilization policies.  While  such  a  realignment  rule--cum 
monetary  policy co-ordination--would  be  sufficient  in  the  face  of dis-
turbances  generated within  the  system,  it may  prove  too  rigid  in cases 
of external  shocks,  such  as  the  recent  sharp depreciation  of  the  U.S. 
dollar.  In  this  case  a  temporary widening  of  the  margins  of  the  cur-
rency  which  has  so  far  p~ayed the  central  role may  prove  the  less  costly 
option,  waiting  for  the  .ime  when  all  currencies  of  the  system  become 
better substitutes  for  each other. -39-
Footnotes 
(1)  However,  only under  the gold  standard,  central  exchange  rates  were 
perfectly fixed  between major  currencies. 
(2)  The  system,  however,  may  have  been  more  asymmetric  than  claimed 
here,  with  the  United  Kingdom  playing  a  central  and  more  dominant 
role and  the  Bank  of  England  "conducting  the  International 
Orchestra"  (Eichengreen,  1987). 
(3)  This  equilibrating property resulted  from  the  fact  that,  with  a 
fixed  nominal  gold  price,  profits  in gold  production and  thus 
world  gold  output  were  raised  by  a  fall  in  the  world  price level 
and  reduced  by  an  increase. 
(4)  See  Sommariva  and  Tullio  (1986)  for  a  theoretical  model  explaining 
the  determinants  of  the  German  discount  rate  under  the  classical 
gold  standard  and  for  empirical  tests  showing  that  changes  in  the 
liquidity ratios  explain changes  in  the discount  rate. 
(5)  See Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik  (1925)  and  Charles  Goodhart 
(1972,  1984). 
(6)  An  even  more  dramatic  concentration of  gold  in U.S.  hands  occurred 
during World  War  II.  Valued  at  35  dollars  an  ounce  the  U.S.  gold 
stock amounted  to  US$8,500  million  in  1931  and  US$26,000  million 
at  the  end  of  World  War  II. 
(7)  Germany  had  flexible  exchange  rates until  the monetary  reform of 
1923.  All  major  industrial  countries had  returned  to  fixed 
exchange  rates  by  1928.  The  period  of  fixed  exchange  rates  was 
very  short  and  lasted until  about  1931,  when  sterling was 
devalued. 
(8)  It must  be  pointed out,  however,  that  the  fall  in this ratio was 
also  due  to  the  sharp  increase  in the  demand  for dollar reserves 
which  resulted  from  world  economic  growth,  the  growth  in world 
trade  and  the  insufficient  world  gold  production.  This  indicates 
that  the  proviso  of  adequate  international  reserves  is also an 
important  condition  for  the  smooth  functioning  of  a  fixed  exchange 
rate  system. 
(9)  This  situation reoccured  in  the  first half  of  1987,  after the 
decision  to stabilise the dollar exchange  rate vis-a-vis  other key 
currencies  (the  "Louvre"  agreement). 
(10)  A practice which  is  being  repeated  with  respect  to  the  deutsche 
mark  in  the  EMS,  with  similar consequences. -40-
(11)  The  "follower"  country  indeed  cannot  "sterilize" its  losses  of 
foreign  reserves  because  any  such credit expansion could  bring 
another  round  of  reserve  losses  equal  to  the  domestic  credit 
expansion  (a  point  noted  by  Mr.  N.  Roubini). 
(12)  It should  be  noted  that  the  size  and  duration  of  a  member 
currencies'  real  appreciation could  be  considered  as  a  measure  of 
the  extent  to  which  the monetary authorities  concerned  have  not 
been  able  to  "borrow credibility"  from  the  Bundesbank.  Further-
more,  as  suggested  by  Melitz  in  this  conference  volume,  to  the 
extent  that credibility is  bought  at  the  expense  of  competitive-
ness,  the  gains  of  credibility have  to  be  weighted  against  the 
output  loss  resulting  from  the  real  appreciation of  the  exchange 
rate.  Thus,  for  countries  like  France  and  Italy,  EMS  participa-
tion may  reduce  welfare. 
(13)  The  reason  for  this  standardization  1s  that  we  wish  to  compare  the 
fraction  of  the  cumulative  variance  of  each variable  explained  by 
the first  principal  component  in  the  analysis  relating  to  the 
group  of  17  industrial  countries  with  that  relating  to  the  EMS 
countries  only.  This  is  done  in Tables 6  ~  and  7  below. 
For  instance  the first  number  1n  Table  6  is obtained  from  Table  A1  in 
Pwendix 1 as follows  (for n=16):  f- 1  0.59  0.0625 
n 
0.56  =  = 
1- 1  1  - 0.0625 
n 
where  f  is  the  fraction of  the variance  explained  by  the first 
principal  component  reported  in Table  A1 
(14)  The  fact  that  long-term nominal  interest rates  show  less  cohension 
in  the  third  period  may  be  due  to  inflation differentials,  which 
were  still significant  and  risk premia  related  to  larger 
differences  in  budget  deficits  in relation  to  domestic  savings. 
(15)  It could  be  argued,  however,  that  offshore  rates  of  currencies 
which  are  subject  to  capital  controls  are  inherently more  volatile 
because,  as  the  internal  and  external  markets  are  separated,  the 
external  ones  bear  the  brunt  of  shocks.  As  they  are generally 
small  markets,  their volatility is  inherently high. 
(16)  The  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  meeting  at  Bremen  on 
July 6-7,  1978,  state that  "not  later  than  two  years  after  the 
start of  the  scheme,  the  existing arrangements  and  institutions 
will  be  consolidated  in  a  European  Monetary  Fund."  The  second 
stage  is also mentioned  in  point  1.4  of  the  Resolution  of  the 
European  Council  of  Bruxelles  on  December  5,  1978. -41-
(17)  Italy and  France  have,  however,  accumulated  deutsche  mark  balances 
which  they  use  for  interventions,  against  the  original  rules  of 
the  system.  See  also Section III.3 where  the  issue  of 
interventions  under  the  EMS  is discussed. 
(18)  Under  perfectly fixed  exchange rates,  which are  expected  to 
prevail  forever,  all currencies  become  perfect  substitutes  in 
investors'  portfolios  (on  the  demand  side).  Substitutions  on  the 
supply  side  (via central  bank  interventions)  will  then  become  an 
important  factor  in  changing  the  stock of  money. 
(19)  This  has  been  an  argument  frequently  used  by  the  supporters  of  the 
entry of  sterling into  the  ERM,  especially in  1986,  when  wages 
were  growing  very rapidly  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
(20)  This  common  inflation target  should  not  be  an  average,  but  the 
lowest  possible  inflation rate acceptable  to  every  member. 
(21)  Note  that  when  comparing  measures  of  capacity utilization for 
Germany,  those  by  the  Bundesbank  are  believed  to  be  on  the  low 
side,  and  its estimates  of  potential  output  growth  have  been 
higher  than  those  of  other  German  forecasters.  The 
Sachverstandigenrat  revised  its estimate of  the  ratio of  actual  to 
potential  output  for  1986  from  98.5  percent  to  96.1  percent, 
presumably  to  adapt  its estimate  to  the  one  of  the  Bundesbank. 
(22)  Switzerland  instead  announces  its target  as  a  point  estimate equal 
to  the  growth of  potential  output  and  assuming  zero  inflation. 
Deviations  from  the  target  are,  however,  accepted if other data 
show  no  inflationary pressure  and  the  deviation  is  not  too  large. 
(23)  Other  estimates,  however,  show  a  relatively stable  demand  for 
money  in Germany. 
(24)  It is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  we  are  talking here  about 
currency substitution on  the  demand  side.  Currency  substitution 
on  the  demand  side among  countries  participating  in  the  ERM  is 
likely to  be  reduced  in  importance  as  realignments  become  less 
frequent  and  expectations  of  exchange  rate  changes  less 
volatile.  At  the  same  time,  substitution on  the  supply  side 
between  ERM  member  currencies  via central  bank  interventions  tn 
the  foreign  exchange  market  will  become  more  important. APPENDIX  I  -42-
Appendix  1  - Principal  Component  Analysis  of  Selected 
Variables:  17  Industrial  Countries 
Consider first  the  monthly rate of  change  of  the  bilateral  exchange 
rate with  the  U.S.  dollar.  The  principal  component  analysis  has  been 
made  for  the  bilateral  exchange  rates  of  16  industrial  countries:  the  7 
countries  participating  in  the  EMS  Exchange  Rate  Agreement  (Germany, 
France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland)  plus  the 
United  Kingdom,  Spain,  Norway,  Sweden,  Austria,  Switzerland,  Canada, 
Australia  and  Japan.  The  analysis  has  been  carried out  separately for  3 
time  periods:  March  1973  to  February  1979,  March  1979  to  February  1983, 
May  1983  to March  1986. 
The  first  period  goes  from  the  beginning  of  floating  to  the 
starting of  the  EMS.  The  second  period  goes  from  the  beginning  of  the 
EMS  up  to  the  general  realignment  of  March  1983.  The  third  period 
starts  in  May  1983,  after  the  disturbances  caused  by  the  March  realign-
ment  had  settled down  and  ends  with  the  month  preceding  the  general 
realignment  of  April  1986.  Thereafter  there  have  been  two  more  realign-
ments  in August  1986  and  January  1987.  It  was  not  possible  to  update 
the analysis  for  lack of  data. 
The  principal  component  analysis  g1ves  some  insights  into  how 
closely the various  currencies  in  the  group  fluctuated  vis-a-vis  the 
U.S.  dollar  in  the  three  subperiods.  It is also  interesting  to  see 
whether  the  data are able  to  isolate an  EMS  block of  currencies within 
the  larger group  and  whether  some  countries  which  are  not  formally  part 
of  the  exchange  rate  agreements  de  facto  behaved  as  if they were.  Such 
candidates  could  be  Switzerland,  Austria,  Norway  and  at  times  Sweden,  as 
their currencies  followed  the  Deutsche  Mark  quite  closely.  On  the  other 
hand,  the analysis  could  indicate that  countries  which  are  formally 
members  of  the  EMS  have  de  facto  not  behaved  as  good  members  due  to  the 
use  of  larger margins  of  fluctuations,  frequent  realignments  or diver-
gent  economic  policies.  (Italy and  France  could  have  been  two  countries 
belonging  to  this  sub-group.). 
Table  Al  summarizes  the  results  of  the  principal  component  analysis 
of  bilateral  exchange  rate  changes  with  the  U.S.  dollar  for  the  first 
period  (1973  3  - 1979  2).  Tables  A2  and  A3  contain  the  results  for  the 
two  EMS-subperiods.  Panel  A of  each  table  shows  the  cumulative  variance 
explained  by  the  first  principal  components  and  panel  B contains  the 
correlation coefficients  of  each country's  variable with  the  first  three 
principal  components.  In  Table  Al  the  first  principal  component  is 
highly correlated with  the  currencies  of  the  DM  area.  The  bilateral 
U.S.  dollar exchange  rates  of  the  following  countries  have  a  correlation 
coefficient higher  than  0.90:  Belgium,  Germany,  Denmark,  the 
Netherlands,  Austria  and  Norway.  France,  Sweden  and  Switzerland  have  a -43- APPENDIX  I 
correlation coefficient  between  0.80  and  0.90.  Ireland,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Italy between  0.60  and  0.70.  The  exchange  rates  of  the  non-
European  countries  have  a  much  lower  correlation coefficient.  Thus  the 
first  principal  component  can  be  identified with  the deutsche  mark-area. 
As  to  the  second  sub-period,  panel  B of Table  A2  indicates  that  the 
first  principal  component  still represents  the  deutsche  mark-area  with 
France,  Italy,  Ireland  and  also  Switzerland  now  moving  closer  to  it 
(correlation coefficient greater  than  or  equal  to  0.90  for all  these 
countries).  Spain also  moves  closer,  while  during  this  period  Norway 
and  Sweden  had  a  more  independent  exchange  rate  policy  than  before. 
During  the  second  EMS  sub-period  panel  B of  Table  A3  indicates  that  the 
EMS  group  showed  an  even  greater cohesion,  with Austria,  Norway,  Sweden, 
Switzerland  and  Spain  now  de  facto  behaving  as  if  they  belonged  to  the 
group. 
What  emerges  from  the  analysis  of  panel  B of  Tables  Al-A3  is  that 
the  original  deutsche  mark-area  of  the  period  of  free  floating  developed 
into  a  more  cohesive  exchange  rate  system  comprising  not  only  the  coun-
tries which  formally  joined  the  exchange  rate agreement,  but  also 
Austria,  Switzerland,  Spain,  Norway  and  Sweden.  The  fraction  of  the 
cumulative  variance  of bilateral  exchange  rate  changes  explained  by  the 
first  principal  component  increases  from  59  percent  during  the  floating 
rate  period  to  72  per  cent  in  the first  EMS  sub-period  and  84  per  cent 
in  the  second. 
The  same  statistical analysis  for  consumer  prices  is  presented  in 
Tables  A4-A6,  the  U.S.  having  been  added  to  the  group  of  countries. 
Even  though  the  fraction  of  the  variance  explained  by  the first  prin-
cipal  component  is much  smaller  than  for bilateral  exchange  rates,  a 
European  block of  countries  can  be  identified  in each  subperiod.  This 
block widens  in  time  to  comprise  additional  countries  and  becomes  more 
cohesive  in  the  second  EMS  sub-period.  During  this  period  France, 
Italy,  Germany,  Belgium and  to  a  lesser extent  Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands  seem  to  form  a  block with high  (and  growing)  cohesion.  U.S. 
inflation also  has  in this  period  a  much  higher  correlation with  the 
first  principal  component  than  in  the  previous  ones,  reflecting the 
common  external  shock  of  the  increase  in oil  prices  and  the  priority 
given  in all  industrial  countries  to  the  fight  against  inflation.  These 
findings  do  not  say  anything  about  whether  the  EMS  has  led  to  a  faster 
reduction  of  inflation  in  the  member  countries. 
The  results  of  the  principal  component  analysis  for  the  17  nominal 
long-term  interest  rates,  are  presented  in  Tables  A7-A9.  During  the 
first  EMS  sub-period  (i.e.  1979-83),  a  remarkable  degree  of  convergence 
of  nominal  long-term  rates  seem  to  emerge  between  Europe  and  the  North 
American  continent  with only British and  Japanese  interest  rates  showing 
greater  independent  behaviour  (Table  A7).  The  very high  interest  rate 
policy  in  the  U.S.  probably  helped  to  bring  about  this  increased 
convergence,  as  European  countries  tried  to  contain  the  depreciation  of 
their currencies with  respect  to  the  U.S.  dollar.  This  occurred  at  a APPENDIX  I  -44-
time  of  growing  financial  integration.  As  to  the  second  EMS  sub-period 
there  is also  no  evidence  of  an  independent  EMS  block,  with  Germany  and 
the  U.S.  being  among  the  countries  possessing  the  highest  correlation 
with  the  first  principal  component.  Table  A7-A9  seem  to  suggest  that  no 
common  independent  European  capital  market  has  emerged  yet,  not  even  1n 
the  second  EMS  sub-period.  They  suggest  instead  a  strong  domination  of 
the  U.S.  capital  market  on  the other countries  in  the  1980's  and  a 
remarkably  high  and  increasing worldwide  integration of  capital 
markets.  This  confirms  Micossi  and  Padoa  Schiappa's  findings  (1984). 
As  to  the  principal  component  analysis  of  nominal  short-term 
interest  rates  (not  shown  here),  there  is also  no  evidence  of  a  greater 
convergence  in  the  EMS  group  of  countries.  This  is  not  surprising, 
however,  as  a  smoothly working  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanism 
within  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system requires  that  movements  in  the 
short-term interest  rate  be  subordinated  to  the  achievement  of  exchange 
rate stability. 
The  principal  component  analysis  of  the  rates  of  change  of  the 
money  stocks  (also not  presented  here)  shows  that  the  first  three 
principal  components  explain a  very  low  fraction  of  the  variance  of  the 
money  stocks.  In addition  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  cohesive  EMS 
block.  Again  this  is hardly  surprising:  the  data  used  are  monthly; 
under  a  system  of  pegged  exchange  rates  the  money  stock has  to  be  sub-
ordinated  to  the  achievement  of  exchange  rate stability and  to  balance 
of  payments  adjustment.  This  implies  short-run  changes  of  the  money 
stocks  of  member  countries  which  at  times  go  in  opposite directions. 
Thus,  as  with  short-term interest rates,  the  inability to  find  evidence 
of  a  common  growth rate of  the  money  stock on  a  monthly  basis  within  the 
EMS  may  indicate more  rather  than  less  monetary  policy coordination. 
Furthermore  a  greater monthly variability of  the  money  stocks  and  less 
monthly  convergence  is  perfectly compatible  with greater  convergence  of 
annual  monetary  growth  as  shown  in  Table  5. -45- APPENDIX  I 
Table  Al. 
A.  Rate  of  Change  of  Bilateral  Exchange  Rates  with U.S.  Dollar 
16  Currencies,  Period  1973  3  to  1979  2 
Princl 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
Princ7 
Princ8 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance 
0.585 
0.685 
0.757 
0.821 
0.872 
0.906 
0.933 
0.954 
Eigenvalues 
9.360 
1.600 
1.159 
1.018 
0.809 
0.549 
0.438 
0.337 
B.  Coefficients of  Correlation with Principal  Components 
Princl  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.687  -0.491  0.118 
United  Kingdom  0.687  -0.491  0.119 
France  0.853  -0.006  0.015 
Italy  0.606  -0.437  0.059 
Belgium  0.962  0.156  -0.079 
Germany  0.941  0.235  -0.056 
Denmark  0.952  0.192  -0.104 
Netherlands  0.938  0.164  -0.053 
Austria  0.942  0.223  -0.074 
Norway  0.908  0.227  -0.041 
Sweden  0.864  0.218  -0.162 
Switzerland  0.843  0.039  0.052 
Australia  0.177  0.074  0.885 
Canada  -0.165  0.637  0.447 
Spain  0.377  -0.381  0.038 
Japan  0.597  -0.276  0.289 
Variance  0.585  0.685  0.757 
Eigenvalues  9.360  1.600  1.159 APPENDIX  I  - 46-
Table  A2. 
A.  Rate  of  Change  of  Bilateral  Exchange  Rates  with U.S.  Dollar 
16  Currencies,  Period  1979  3  to  1983  2 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance  Eigenvalues 
Princl  0.722  11.554 
Princ2  0.803  1.297 
Princ3  0.860  0.909 
Princ4  0.905  0.725 
Princ5  0.931  0.405 
Princ6  0.952  0.341 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with  Principal  Components 
Princl  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.977  -0.127  0.067 
United  Kingdom  0.682  -0.057  -0.533 
France  0.962  -0.034  0.109 
Italy  0.965  -0.025  0.032 
Belgium  0.953  -0.024  0.094 
Germany  0.965  -0.070  0.021 
Denmark  0.956  -0.014  0.175 
Netherlands  0.964  -0.103  0.174 
Austria  0.960  -0.074  0.220 
Norway  0.884  0.162  -0.080 
Sweden  0.649  0.231  -0.468 
Switzerland  0.900  0.022  0.211 
Australia  0.706  0.568  -0.115 
Canada  0.518  -0.495  -0.292 
Spain  0.692  -0.503  -0.266 
Japan  0.646  0.595  -0.103 
Variance  0.722  0.803  0.860 
Eigenvalues  11.554  1.297  0.909 -47- APPENDIX  I 
Table  A3. 
A.  Rate  of  Change  of  Bilateral  Exchange  Rates  with U.S.  Dollar 
16  Currencies,  Period  1983  to  1986  3 
Princl 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance 
0.839 
0.910 
0.951 
Eigenvalues 
13.424 
1.129 
0.660 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with Principal  Components 
Princl  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.992  -0.061  0.021 
United  Kingdom  0.838  0.020  0.413 
France  0.992  -0.091  -0.022 
Italy  0.970  -0.077  -0.093 
Belgium  0.991  -0.079  -0.030 
Germany  0.992  -0.074  -0.050 
Denmark  0.990  -0.075  -0.021 
Netherlands  0.994  -0.066  -0.036 
Austria  0.992  -0.073  -0.057 
Norway  0.981  -0.017  0.076 
Sweden  0.984  -0.032  -0.006 
Switzerland  0.975  0.054  0.063 
Australia  0.437  0.723  -0.493 
Canada  0.462  0.742  0.426 
Spain  0.962  -0.072  -0.017 
Japan  0.826  -0.029  -0.192 
Variance  0.839  0.910  0.951 
Eigenvalues  13.424  1.129  0.660 APPENDIX  I  -48-
Table  A4. 
A.  Consumer  Prices,  Rates  of  Change  of  17  Countries, 
Period  1979  3  to  1983  2 
Prine! 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
Princ7 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance 
0.227 
0.370 
0.484 
0.571 
0.644 
0.702 
0.757 
Eigenvalues 
3.852 
2.433 
1.947 
1.474 
1.239 
0.997 
0.933 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with Principal  Components 
Prine!  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.452  -0.514  0.299 
United  Kingdom  0.577  -0.338  -0.106 
France  0.719  0.008  -0.069 
Italy  0.084  -0.033  -0.745 
Belgium  0.385  0.362  -0.193 
Germany  0.581  0.114  0.222 
Denmark  0.314  -0.458  -0.091 
Netherlands  0.541  -0.324  -0.347 
Austria  0.673  0.416  0.333 
Norway  0.610  0.354  0.122 
Sweden  0.505  0.409  -0.419 
Switzerland  0.144  -0.242  0.567 
Australia  -0.237  -0.458  -0.336 
Canada  0.288  -0.511  0.374 
Spain  0.503  0.531  -0.028 
Japan  0.342  -0.386  -0.440 
United  States  0.551  -0.410  0.015 
Variance  0.227  0.370  0.484 
Eigenvalues  3.852  2.433  1.947 -49-
Table  AS. 
A.  Consumer  Prices,  Rates  of  Change  of  17  Countries, 
Period  1973  3  to  1979  2 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
APPENDIX  I 
Variance  Eigenvalues 
Prine! 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
Princ7 
Princ8 
0.236 
0.346 
0.450 
0.529 
0.594 
0.656 
0.714 
0.764 
4.005 
1.883 
1.769 
1.330 
1.119 
1.053 
0.978 
0.858 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with  Principal  Components 
Prine!  Princ2  Prine) 
Ireland  0.643  -0.161  0.339 
United  Kingdom  0.588  0.123  0.434 
France  0.643  -0.213  -0.298 
Italy  0.579  -0.242  -0.196 
Belgium  0.699  -o.  o'83  -0.193 
Germany  0.602  0.508  0.266 
Denmark  0.240  -0.271  -0.186 
Netherlands  0.595  -0.278  0.024 
Austria  0.452  0.667  0.121 
Norway  0.292  0.352  0.235 
Sweden  0.227  0.492  -0.060 
Switzerland  0.348  0.271  -0.249 
Australia  0.535  -0.480  -0.060 
Canada  0.049  0.269  -0.703 
Spain  -0.010  -0.191  0.081 
Japan  0.669  -0.189  0.039 
United  States  0.194  0.252  -0.744 
Variance  0.236  0.346  0.450 
Eigenvalues  4.005  1.883  1.769 APPENDIX  I  -50-
Table  A6. 
A.  Consumer  Prices,  Rates  of  Change  of  17  Countries, 
Period  1983  5  to  1986  3 
Princ1 
Princ2 
Prine) 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
Princ7 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance 
0.282 
0.424 
0.523 
0.612 
0.677 
0.739 
0.787 
Eigenvalues 
4.800 
2.410 
1.687 
1.505 
1.109 
1.048 
0.823 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with  Principal  Components 
Princ1  Princ2  Prine) 
Ireland  0.454  -0.346  0.435 
United  Kingdom  0.361  0.294  0.441 
France  0.782  0.145  0.233 
Italy  0.725  0.198  -0.211 
Belgium  0.765  -0.205  0.332 
Germany  0.783  -0.179  -0.097 
Denmark  0.572  0.542  0.014 
Netherlands  0.666  0.458  0.005 
Austria  0.461  -0.665  -0.088 
Norway  0.332  -0.159  -0.638 
Sweden  0.389  -0.197  -0.368 
Switzerland  0.495  -0.161  -0.088 
Australia  -0.224  0.221  -0.020 
Canada  0.100  -0.599  0.236 
Spain  0.194  -0.594  -0.402 
Japan  0.301  0.515  -0.544 
United  States  0.672  0.092  0.116 
Variance  0.282  0.424  0.523 
Eigenvalues  4.800  2.410  1.687 -51-
Table  A7. 
A.  Nominal  Long-Term  Interest Rates  of  16  Countries, 
Period  1973  3  to  1979  2 
Cumulative Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
APPENDIX  I 
Variance  Eigenvalues 
Princ1 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
0.378 
0.730 
0.856 
0.904 
0.931 
0.954 
6.046 
5.627 
2.021 
0.769 
0.427 
0.367 
B.  Coefficients  of Correlation with Principal  Components 
Prine!  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.752  -0.472  0.241 
United  Kingdom  0.734  -0.538  0.049 
France  0.712  -0.354  0.001 
Italy  -0.262  -0.858  0.337 
Belgium  0.368  -0.833  0.224 
Germany  0.767  0.562  -0.219 
Denmark  0.046  -0.592  -0.597 
Netherlands  0.866  -0.112  -0.221 
Austria  0.839  -0.101  -0.112 
Norway  -0.363  -0.798  -0.339 
Sweden  -0.529  -0.821  0.114 
Switzerland  0.877  0.405  -0.152 
Australia  0.281  -0.808  0.379 
Canada  0.085  -0.832  -0.400 
Japan  0.949  0.054  0.149 
United  States  -0.134  -0.217  -0.924 
Variance  0.378  0.730  0.856 
Eigenvalues  6.046  5.627  2.021 APPENDIX  I 
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Table  A8. 
A.  Nominal  Long-Term  Interest  Rates  of  16  Countries, 
Period  1979  3  to  1983  2 
Princ1 
Princ2 
Prine) 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Cumulative Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
Variance 
0.718 
0.859 
0.918 
0.944 
0.960 
Eigenvalues 
11.481 
2.266 
0.945 
0.416 
0.258 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with Principal  Components 
Princl  Princ2  Prine) 
Ireland  0.750  -0.197  0.554 
United  Kingdom  0.576  -0.690  0.312 
France  0.951  0.214  -0.128 
Italy  0.889  0.426  0.049 
Belgium  0.952  0.177  -0.159 
Germany  0.890  -0.323  0.007 
Denmark  0.796  0.341  0.022 
Netherlands  0.847  -0.463  -0.042 
Austria  0.960  -0.103  -0.009 
Norway  0.856  0.437  -0.102 
Sweden  0.878  0.282  -0.265 
Switzerland  0.937  -0.243  -0.102 
Australia  0.865  0.434  0.097 
Canada  0.965  -0.060  0.056 
Japan  0.245  -0.672  -0.617 
United  States  0.895  -0.273  0.093 
Variance  0.718  0.859  0.918 
Eigenvalues  11.481  2.266  0.945 -53-
Table  A9. 
A.  Nominal  Long-Term  Interest  Rates  of  16  Countries, 
Period  1983  5  to  1986  3 
Cumulative  Variance  and  Eigenvalues 
APPENDIX  I 
Variance  Eigenvalues 
Prine! 
Princ2 
Princ3 
Princ4 
Princ5 
Princ6 
0.606 
0.762 
0.850 
0.896 
0.935 
0.955 
9.696 
2.500 
1.398 
0.747 
0.620 
0.325 
B.  Coefficients  of  Correlation with Principal  Components 
Prine!  Princ2  Princ3 
Ireland  0.898  -0.238  0.104 
United  Kingdom  0.580  -0.355  -0.291 
France  0.895  0.362  -0.077 
Italy  0.669  0.641  -0.016 
Belgium  0.941  -0.115  0.083 
Germany  0.934  0.258  0.021 
Denmark  0.860  -0.164  0.008 
Netherlands  0.924  0.346  -0.036 
Austria  0.834  0.057  0.105 
Norway  -0.768  0.348  -0.398 
Sweden  0.085  -0.735  -0.509 
Switzerland  0.525  -0.727  -0.342 
Australia  0.121  0.507  -0.748 
Canada  0.875  -0.103  0.173 
Japan  0.876  0.239  -0.352 
United  States  0.916  -0.176  0.174 
Variance  0.606  0.762  0.850 
Eigenvalues  9.696  2.500  1.398 APPENDIX  II  -54-
Appendix  2  - Stability Analysis  of  a  Two  Country  Model  Under 
Alternative Monetary  Rules  and  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  (*) 
I.  Introduction 
This  appendix  is  intended  to  study  the  stability of  an  EMS-like 
agreement  under  alternative monetary  rules.  In  particular the  rule 
developed  in  Section  IV.2  of  the  paper will  be  investigated.  The 
contribution of nonsterilization of  international  reserve  flows  to  the 
stability of  the  EMS  will  be  demonstrated. 
Any  movement  toward  less  frequent  changes  of  parities  and  the 
removal  of  barriers  to capital mobility will  fundamentally  change  the 
operating  conditions  of  the  EMS  and  require  new  rules  for  coordinating 
monetary  policy.  FixeL  exchange  rates  and  unrestricted capital  flows 
will  necessarily  be  accompanied  by  a  very  high  degree  of  currency 
substitution among  the  currencies  of  countries  participating  in  the 
exchange  rate mechanism  (ERM),  a  situation which  is  already observable 
to  some  extent  in  the  present  less  than  perfect  state of  monetary 
integration. 
The  monetary  rules  considered are  two:  (i)  a  rule  consisting of 
controlling  the  total  monetary  base,  with its  implied  sterilization of 
foreign  exchange  reserve  variations;  and  (ii)  a  rule consisting  of 
controlling  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base. 
The  implications  for  stability of  the  adoption  of  these  two  rules 
will  be  evaluated  both  under  the  assumption  of  partially variable 
managed  exchange  rates  and  under  the  assumption  of  perfectly fixed 
exchange  rates. 
II.  Stability Analysis  of  a  Managed  Exchange  Rate  Regime 
For  analytical  purposes,  the  actual  exchange  rate  agreement  of  the 
European  Monetary  System will  be  modelled  as  a  managed  exchange  rate 
regime.  The  regime  is  potentially a  floating  one,  but  exchange  rate 
movements  are  damped  down  through  foreign  exchange  market 
intervention.  We  shall  examine  which  monetary  rules  return  the  exchange 
rate  to  its equilibrium level  and  the  relative  speed  of  convergence. 
(*)  This  appendix  has  been  written  by  Eric  de  Souza  of  the  University 
of  Louvain-la-Neuve  in  collaboration  with  Giuseppe  Tullio. -55- APPENDIX  II 
1.  We  shall  consider  two  countries  that  are  sufficiently large 
relative  to  each other  so  as  to  exert  significant  reciprocal  influences. 
and  shall refer  to  them  as  Germany  and  Italy.  The  analysis will  rely on 
the  monetary mechanism  of  the balance  of  payments  adjustment  and 
exchange  rate determination. 
In each  economy  wealth is held  in  the  form  of  money  and  goods,  so 
that  any  excess  demand  for  money  must  spill  over  into  an  excess  supply 
of  goods,  just as  an  excess  supply of  moeny  means  that  there  is  an 
excess  demand  for  goods.  The  demand  for  money  is characterized  by  a 
stable relationship which  depends  on  real  income.  It also  depends  on 
the  interest rate  but  we  shall  ignore  this  complication as  we  shall  not 
consider  interest rate adjustments.  We  shall  also  neglect  the  role  of 
currency substitution. 
In a  closed  economy,  when  there  is an  excess  supply of  money,  the 
accompanying  excess  demand  for  goods  will  lead  to  a  rise  in prices 
unless  increased  supplies  are  forthcoming.  In  this  way  real  cash 
balances  adapt  and  equilibrium is  reestablished  in  the  goods  and  money 
markets.  This  mechanism  is  not  immediately operative  in  an  open 
economy.  An  excess  supply of  money  will  lead  to  an  excess  demand  for 
goods  in general,  and  in  so  far  as  this  can  be  expended  on  imports, 
there will  be  no  tendency  for  prices  to rise.  Instead  a  trade deficit 
will  be  incurred.  If the  exchange  rate is free  to  vary,  this will 
result  in a  depreciation of  the  domestic  currency.  In  a  similar manner, 
an  excess  supply of  the  foreign  currency will  lead  to  a  trade  surplus at 
home  and  a  consequent  appreciation of  the  exchange  rate.  The  above 
reason1ng  is  incorporated  in  the  following  equation: 
(1)  S = a(M  - PY)  - S(M*  - P*Y*)  a,S>O 
where  S  is  the  exchange  rate  (the price  in Italian lire or  deutsche 
mark),  M is  the  Italian monetary  base,  P  the  price  level  in Italy and  Y 
the  level  of output.  Asterisks  indicate  the  corresponding  variables  for 
Germany. 
Under  freely  floating  exchange  rates  and  instantaneous  adjustment 
of  portfolios,  the  above  equation  would  determine  the  level  of  the 
exchange  rate and  not  its evolution.  However,  in  our  context  changes  in 
the  exchange  rate are  tempered  (or exacerbated)  by  intervention of  the 
central  banks  of  the  two  countries  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  This 
formulation  ignores  the  existence of  a  band  around  the  central 
par1t1es.  For  the  analysis  of  the stability of  the  system which 
concerns  us  here  this neglect  is not  of  very great  importance, 
especially if the  banks  are  sufficiently large as  in  the  case  of 
Icaly.  Intervention can  either  lean against  the  wind  or with it.  In 
the  simplest  case,  Italian intervention  in  the  foreign  exchanges  can  be 
modelled  as: APPENDIX  II  -56-
( 2') 
where  R  is  the  change  in  the  level  of  international  reserves  held  by 
the  central  bank,  and  s0  is  the  central  parity of  the  Italian lira with 
the  deutsche  mark,  the  target  exchange  rate.  y  is  a  policy 
parameter:  it expresses  the attitude of  the  Italian central  bank.  When 
y  is positive,  the  bank  is  considered  as  leaning  against  the  wind; 
when  negative,  it reinforces  the  pressures  of  the  foreign  exchange 
market  on  the  rate of  exchange.  The  larger  y  is  in absolute  value, 
the  stronger  the  reaction of  the  central  bank. 
In equation  (2')  above,  changes  in reserves  were  rigidly guided  by 
the  foreign  exchange  market  intervention  rule.  Remaining  balance  of 
payments  disequilibria were  absorbed  by  changes  in  the  exchange  rate. 
Consistently with  the  narrow bands  of  variation  in exchange  rates  around 
the  central  parities  in  the  exchange  rate mechanism,  we  allow,  however, 
disequilibria resulting  from  excess  or deficient  private holdings  of 
real  cash balances  to  influence  both  exchange  rates  and  reserves. 
Consider  Italy once  again.  Suppose  for  a  moment  that  the  central  bank 
intervenes  to  keep  exchange  rates  firmly  pegged.  Then  the  entire 
disequilibrium in private holdings  of  cash balances will  spill  over  into 
changes  of  international  reserve  holdings  of  the  central  bank: 
B = - o  (M  - PY)  +  o (M*  - P*Y*) 
1  2 
where  B is  the  change  in reserves  held  by  the  Italian central  bank as  a 
consequence  of  private transactions.  Now  let  the  central  bank  relax its 
rigid  stance.  If B is negative,  the  Italian monetary authorities will 
partially let the lira depreciate,  partially absorb  the  excess  supply of 
Italian lira by  selling Deutsche  mark.  Therefore: 
R  =  B  +  y  (S  - s
0
) 
where  R  represents  actual  changes  in  international  reserves  held  by 
the  Italian central  bank.  In  the  above  illustration,  y  <  0  with  the 
bank  reinforcing  private market  pressures  by  accepting  a  larger fall  in 
international  reserves.  When  y  is  positive,  the  Italian central  bank 
buys  marks  when  the  Italian lira tends  to  depreciate.  The  latter is 
clearly not  the  behavior  that  central  banks  normally  adopt.  The  two 
basic  equations  now  are: 
(1)  S  =  a(M  - PY)  - S(M*  - P*Y*) -57- APPENDIX  II 
The  above  model  is closed  by  introducing  the  following  identities: 
(3)  M = D +  R 
(4)  M*  = D*  +  R* 
where  D refers  to  the  domestic  credit  component  of  the  monetary  base. 
The  two  equations  define  the  monetary  base  for  Italy and  Germany  as  the 
sum  of  domestic  credit available  from  the  central  bank  and  its holdings 
of  international  reserves. 
The  final  identity links  the holdings  of  international  reserves  by  the 
two  countries with each other.  Let  R  be  the  total availability of 
(outside)  international  reserves  measured  in marks.  Then: 
(5)  SR  +  R*  = R 
We  shall evaluate reserves  at  the central  parity exchange  rate level. 
Moreover,  without  loss  of generality,  we  shall  normalize  this  level  to 
unity.  We  thus  obtain: 
s0R +  R*  = R +  R*  = R 
Given  equation  (2),  equation  (5)  determines  the  change  in German 
holdings  of  international  reserves. 
l.A  We  shall first  suppose  that neither Italy nor  Germany  sterilizes 
the effects of  international  reserve  flows  on  their monetary  bases.  The 
domestic  credit  component  is held  constant  since  output  is held  fixed  as 
well  as  prices.  The  resulting differential  system is  the  following: 
(  ~  \J~  a  +  al  (  S  \  + (a (  D - PY)  - a  (  D*  + R - P*Y*)  ) 
\a) lr- (01+  0:1  ~R)  ~-y- o1  (D- PY)  +  o2  (D*  + R- P*Y*) 
where  s0  has  been  normalized  to  unity. APPENDIX  II  -58-
The  characteristic equation  of  the  above  system is: 
the  roots  of  the  equation are: 
2 
± 
((ol  +  62)2  +  4(a  +  S)y}I/2 
2 
Intervention rule (i):  y  >  0 
With  y  positive,  the  system has  a  saddle  point  behavior.  This 
requ1res  an  initial discretionary intervention  in order  to attain the 
unique  convergent  path. 
Intervention rule  (ii):  y  <  0 
With  y  negative,  the  Italian central  bank  reinforces  the  movement  of 
reserves  initiated by  adjustment  of  private cash  balances  to  desired 
levels.  In  this  case,  the  system is asymptotically stable.  Any  initial 
point  leads  to  equilibrium either monotonically or with fluctuations 
depending  on  the  sign of 
Central  bank  behavior  in relation  to  interventions  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market  is generally characterized  by  a  negative  y  Actual 
behavior  leads  therefore  to  a  stable  system. 
l.B  Now  suppose  that  Italy intervenes  on  the  foreign  exchanges  and  does 
not  sterilize the effects of  reserve  flows;  whereas  Germany  does 
sterilize the  effects  of  reserve  changes  on  its money  stock.  This  form 
of  asymmetric  nonsterilized  intervention has  characterized  the  European 
Monetary  System  so  far. 
In  this  case  the  following  equation  must  be  added  to  the  five  listed 
above: 
(6)  D*  = -R*,  or  equivalently,  M*  =  M* -59-
The  differential  system now  becomes: 
(  ~) = t.-0  aJ (SJ + l/ a(D  - PY)  - B  (M*  - P*Y*)  ) 
R  y -o  R  -y  - o (D  - PY)  +  o (M*  - P*Y*)  '  1  1  2 
The  characteristic equation  now  is: 
A2  +  o1A - ay 
with roots: 
A = 
Once  aga1n,  if  y  >  O,  the  system is characterized  by  saddlepoint 
behavior,  whereas  if  y  <  O,  the  system is asymptotically  stable. 
APPENDIX  II 
The  sterilization of  international  reserve  flows  by  Germany  affects 
the relative  speed  of  convergence  to equilibrium of  the  exchange  rate 
and  of  reserves.  When  Italy intervenes  as  it normally does  (  y  <  0), 
then  sterilization by  Germany  slows  down  the  convergence  of  the  system 
as  can  be  seen  by  comparing  the  larger of  the  two  roots  in  the  two  cases 
described  above  (case  l.A - symmetric  nonsterilization by  both 
countries,  and  case  l.B  - Nonsterilization by  Italy and  sterilization by 
Germany). 
If, moreover,  Italy behaves  such  that  y  >  0  and  is  on  the 
convergent  path,  then  the  speed  of  convergence  if further  hampered. 
l.C  If now  Italy intervenes  on  the  foreign  exchanges  and  sterilizes  the 
effects of  reserve  changes,  whereas  Germany  allows  reserve  changes  to 
affect its monetary base,  conclusions  about  the  stability of  the  system 
are  like in case  l.B. 
l.D  The  system breaks  down  if both countries  refuse  to allow their 
monetary  base  to  be  influenced  by  the  international  reserve  flows.  It 
provokes  the  continuous  accumulation  of  reserves  by  one  country and  a 
continuous  loss  by  the  other. APPENDIX  II  -00-
III.  Stability Analysis  of  a  Fixed  Exchange  Rate  Regime 
With  the  trans1t1on  to  credibly fixed  exchange  rates  between  the 
member  countries  of  the  European  Monetary  System and  the  removal  of 
barriers  to capital mobility,  the  degree  of  currency substitution 
between  the  member  states will  become  very high  indeed. 
Under  a  regime  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  the entire brunt  of 
disequilibria  in  private money  holdings,  that  is,  the  adjustment  of 
actual  money  holdings  to  the  desired  level  is  borne  by  changes  in 
international  reserves  at  the  central  bank: 
(1)  R  =  - o  (M  - PY)  +  o  (M*  - P*Y*)  1  2 
Moreover,  in  the  absenc~ of  restrictions  to capital  flows,  national 
currencies  become  perfect  substitutes  and  only  the  total  aggregate  money 
stock will  reveal  stable behavior.  Furthermore,  prices  in  the different 
countries will  have  to  align  themselves  to  each other: 
(2)  P = P* 
In  such  a  world,  excess  supplies  of  money  will  be  absorbed  not  only 
by  an  international  transfer of  reserves  but  also  by  an  adjustment  of 
prices  in both countries.  Consider  a  rise of  output  levels  in Italy and 
the  consequent  shortage of  real  cash balances.  The  resulting movement 
of  reserves  toward  Italy will  provoke  a  shortage  in  Germany.  Hence,  the 
output  shock will  ultimately be  absorbed  by  price  changes: 
(3)  P  =  P*  =  (M  +  M*  - P(Y  +  Y*)) 
International  reserve  changes  in  both countries  are directed  toward 
the maintenance  of  fixed  exchange  rates.  It remains  to determine  the 
behavior  of  domestic  credit.  Assume  the  domestic  component  of  the 
monetary  base  is  targeted  to  a  permanent  zero  rate of  inflation.  Two 
other alternatives will  be  considered,  namely,  the  targeting of  domestic 
credit  to  temporary  changes  in  prices;  and  the  targeting of  the  total 
monetary  base  to  the  same  end. 
1.  Consider first  the  case  in which  the  domestic  component  of  the 
monetary  base  is kept  constant.  In  Section  IV.2  of  the  paper  the  rule 
proposed  was  that  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  should 
grow at  the  same  rate  as  the  sum  of  desired  inflation and  potential 
output  (equation  (6')).  Since  here  derived  inflation is  assumed  to  be -61- APPENDIX  II 
zero  and  potential  output  is assumed  to  be  constant,  the  case  considered 
here  is  the  dynamic  version of  rule  IV.2.  The  system reduces  to  two 
equations: 
&  y  -&  y~  1  2 
-n(Y  +  Y*) 
with characteristic equation: 
and  roots: 
Since  both roots  are negative,  the  system  ~s  asymptotically stable. 
2.  Now  suppose  that  both countries  adapt  the  domestic  component  of  the 
monetary base  to counteract  temporary price movements: 
D = - aP  D*  = - SP* 
An  unexpected  rise in output  in Italy will  lead  to  an  increase  in 
Italian reserves  and  a  fall  in prices.  If a  and  S  are  positive,  the 
necessary adaptation of  the  Italian monetary base will  be  hastened, 
whereas  the undesired  reduction  of  the  German  monetary  base 
neutralised.  The  complete  system of differential equations  is: 
~1 o  o  ol  ") 
1-< &  1  +  (62~) 
R  & )  & y  - & Y*  -&  6] (  R  \  2  1  ~  1 
~ 
I  0  -n(Y  +  *)  n  P  \  0  1  0  OJ  I  o 
n  +  nR 
0  a  1  0  ()  =  0  0  0  D  )  0 
\ 
0  B 0  1  f.>*  0  0  0  0  D* /  \  0 
i.- \  I  '  I 
with  the  roots  of  its characteristic equation  equal  to: 
A.  = 0  (twice) 
= - (&1  +  &2) 
=  - [(a  +  S)  +  (Y  +  Y*)] n APPENDIX  II  -62-
The  two  zero  roots  correspond  to  the  collinearity between  the 
dynamics  of  the  price  level  and  domestic  credit  in  the  two  countries. 
The  other  two  toots  are  both  negative  if a  and  a  are  positive.  The 
system  is  always  stable  in  this  case.  If,  however,  a  and  B  are 
negative,  with  large values,  implying  that  the  central  banks  accommodate 
a  rise  in  inflation,  then  the  system will  exhibit  saddlepoint  behavior. 
3.  Both  countries  are  now  supposed  to  target  their total  monetary  base 
to  inflation: 
M =  -aP  M*  =  oP 
In  this case,  three  roots  of  the  corresponding  characteristic equation 
are  zero,  whereas  the  fourth  is  equal  to: 
-(a  +  8  +  Y +  Y*)n 
It is,  consequently,  negative  for  a  and 
base  control,  the  system  is characterized 
subjected  to  shocks  it will  not  return  to 
to another  one. 
B  positive.  Under  monetary 
by  hysteresis,  that  is,  when 
its original equilibrium but 
IV.  Conclusion 
The  examination  of  various  monetary  rules  in  the  context  of  the 
monetary  approach  to  the  balance  of  payments,  both  under  managed  and 
fixed  exchange  rates  has  led  to  a  presumption  in  favor  of  rules  based  on 
control  of  the  domestic  credit  component  of  the  monetary  base.  This 
evaluation has  been  based  on  the criteria of  stability,  speeds  of 
convergence  and  determinateness.  The  analysis  of  this appendix  confirms 
therefore  that  a  rule  like  the  one  proposed  in  Section  IV.2  of  the  paper 
implies  a  stable  system. -63-
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